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Corporate finance and state enterprise reform in China

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  • Su, Dongwei

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  • Su, Dongwei, 2005. "Corporate finance and state enterprise reform in China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 118-148.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:chieco:v:16:y:2005:i:2:p:118-148
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    Cited by:

    1. Reddy, Kotapati Srinivasa, 2015. "Market for Corporate Control and Contractual Buyout (CoBO): A New “Collective Ownership-and-Administrative” Strategy," MPRA Paper 63937, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2015.
    2. Chen Lin & Yue Ma & Dongwei Su, 2009. "Corporate governance and firm efficiency: evidence from China's publicly listed firms," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 30(3), pages 1-1.
    3. K.S. Reddy & En Xie & Yuanyuan Huang, 2016. "Contractual buyout - a legitimate growth model in the enterprise development: foundations and implications," International Journal of Management and Enterprise Development, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 15(1), pages 1-23.
    4. Chen Lin & Wei Shen & Dongwei Su, 2011. "Executive Pay at Publicly Listed Firms in China," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(2), pages 417-436.
    5. Jiang, Zhan & Kim, Kenneth A., 2013. "Financial management in China," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 125-133.
    6. K. Hung Chan & Phyllis L. L. Mo & Amy Y. Zhou & Steven Cahan, 2013. "Government ownership, corporate governance and tax aggressiveness: evidence from China," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 53(4), pages 1029-1051, December.
    7. Dongwei Su & Xingxing He, 2012. "Ownership structure, corporate governance and productive efficiency in China," Journal of Productivity Analysis, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 303-318, December.
    8. Hao Shi, 2006. "L'évolution du "calcul économique en équipe" : un processus de légitimation des changements institutionnels en Chine," Working Papers 2006-4, Laboratoire Orléanais de Gestion - université d'Orléans.
    9. Ratnam Vijayakumaran, 2019. "Ownership Reform, State Ownership, Corporate Governance, and Agency Costs: The Case of Chinese Listed Companies," Research in World Economy, Research in World Economy, Sciedu Press, vol. 10(1), pages 91-104, June.
    10. Trien Le & Amon Chizema, 2011. "State ownership and firm performance: Evidence from the Chinese listed firms," Organizations and Markets in Emerging Economies, Faculty of Economics, Vilnius University, vol. 2(2).
    11. Lin, Chen & Su, Dongwei, 2008. "Industrial diversification, partial privatization and firm valuation: Evidence from publicly listed firms in China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 405-417, September.
    12. Chen Lin & Dongwei Su, 2009. "Does state control affect managerial incentives? Evidence from china's publicly listed firms," Journal of Business Economics and Management, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 10(4), pages 291-311, September.

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