IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/apmaco/v269y2015icp343-350.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The effect of noise and average relatedness between players in iterated games

Author

Listed:
  • EL-Seidy, Essam

Abstract

In the real world, repetitive game theory has an influential and effective role, especially in political, economic, biological, social sciences and many other sciences. In this work we are exposed to study the effect of noise on the degree of relatedness between the players with respect to the behavior of strategies and its payoff. Our model in this work is the infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game. Because our game is infinitely repeated, we consider any strategy of the game represented by a finite states of automaton (two states). By considering the possibility of a small error in implementation of an automaton, we obtained the payoff matrix for all strategies. Consequently we could identify the behavior of some of the strategies.

Suggested Citation

  • EL-Seidy, Essam, 2015. "The effect of noise and average relatedness between players in iterated games," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 269(C), pages 343-350.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:apmaco:v:269:y:2015:i:c:p:343-350
    DOI: 10.1016/j.amc.2015.07.053
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0096300315009728
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.amc.2015.07.053?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1990. "Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(2), pages 274-279, May.
    2. Banks, Jeffrey S. & Sundaram, Rangarajan K., 1990. "Repeated games, finite automata, and complexity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 97-117, June.
    3. Abreu, Dilip & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1988. "The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(6), pages 1259-1281, November.
    4. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1986. "Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 83-96, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Alam, Muntasir & Nagashima, Keisuke & Tanimoto, Jun, 2018. "Various error settings bring different noise-driven effects on network reciprocity in spatial prisoner's dilemma," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 338-346.
    2. Li, Jiaqi & Zhang, Jianlei & Chen, Zengqiang & Liu, Qun, 2023. "Aspiration drives adaptive switching between two different payoff matrices," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 446(C).
    3. Ye, Wenxing & Feng, Weiying & Lü, Chen & Fan, Suohai, 2017. "Memory-based prisoner’s dilemma game with conditional selection on networks," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 307(C), pages 31-37.
    4. Li, Jiaqi & Dang, Jianwu & Zhang, Jianlei, 2020. "Length of information-based bidirectional choice in spatial prisoner’s dilemma," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 369(C).
    5. Li, Jiaqi & Zhang, Jianlei & Liu, Qun, 2024. "Spatial game with multiple interaction patterns in constrained interaction environment: A computational method based on opponent’s ability," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 178(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ho, Teck-Hua, 1996. "Finite automata play repeated prisoner's dilemma with information processing costs," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-3), pages 173-207.
    2. Zhang, Huanren, 2018. "Errors can increase cooperation in finite populations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 203-219.
    3. K. Binmore & L. Samuelson, 2010. "Evolutionary Stability in Repeated Games Played by Finite Automata," Levine's Working Paper Archive 561, David K. Levine.
    4. Ueda, Masahiko, 2023. "Memory-two strategies forming symmetric mutual reinforcement learning equilibrium in repeated prisoners’ dilemma game," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 444(C).
    5. Hubie Chen, 2013. "Bounded rationality, strategy simplification, and equilibrium," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(3), pages 593-611, August.
    6. Spiegler, Ran, 2004. "Simplicity of beliefs and delay tactics in a concession game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 200-220, April.
    7. Anderlini, Luca & Sabourian, Hamid, 2001. "Cooperation and computability in n-player games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 99-137, September.
    8. García, Julián & van Veelen, Matthijs, 2016. "In and out of equilibrium I: Evolution of strategies in repeated games with discounting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 161(C), pages 161-189.
    9. Spiegler, Ran, 2005. "Testing threats in repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 121(2), pages 214-235, April.
    10. Hernández, Penélope & Solan, Eilon, 2016. "Bounded computational capacity equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 342-364.
    11. Binmore, Ken & Piccione, Michele & Samuelson, Larry, 1998. "Evolutionary Stability in Alternating-Offers Bargaining Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 257-291, June.
    12. Samuelson, Larry, 1996. "Bounded rationality and game theory," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(Supplemen), pages 17-35.
    13. Pedro Dal Bo & Guillaume R. Frochette, 2011. "The Evolution of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: Experimental Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(1), pages 411-429, February.
    14. Stefano Demichelis & Jorgen W. Weibull, 2008. "Language, Meaning, and Games: A Model of Communication, Coordination, and Evolution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1292-1311, September.
    15. Ehud Kalai, 1995. "Games," Discussion Papers 1141, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    16. Jones, Matthew T., 2014. "Strategic complexity and cooperation: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 352-366.
    17. Wichardt, Philipp C., 2010. "Modelling equilibrium play as governed by analogy and limited foresight," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 472-487, November.
    18. Christos Ioannou, 2014. "Coevolution of finite automata with errors," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 24(3), pages 541-571, July.
    19. Demichelis, Stefano & Weibull, Jörgen, 2006. "Efficiency, communication and honesty," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 645, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 28 Nov 2006.
    20. Westhoff, Frank H. & Yarbrough, Beth V. & Yarbrough, Robert M., 1996. "Complexity, organization, and Stuart Kauffman's The Origins of Order," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 1-25, January.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:apmaco:v:269:y:2015:i:c:p:343-350. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.journals.elsevier.com/applied-mathematics-and-computation .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.