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An Information Good Market with Symmetric Externalities

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  • Muto, Shigeo

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  • Muto, Shigeo, 1986. "An Information Good Market with Symmetric Externalities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(2), pages 295-312, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:54:y:1986:i:2:p:295-312
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Emeric Henry & Carlos J. Ponce, 2011. "Waiting to Imitate: On the Dynamic Pricing of Knowledge," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 119(5), pages 959-981.
    2. Emeric Henry & Carlos J. Ponce, 2011. "Waiting to Imitate: On the Dynamic Pricing of Knowledge," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 119(5), pages 959-981.
    3. Saracho, Ana I., 2011. "Licensing information goods," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 187-199, March.
    4. Nobuyuki Hanaki & Yutaka Kayaba & Jun Maekawa & Hitoshi Matsushima, 2021. "Trading information goods on a network: An experiment," ISER Discussion Paper 1151, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    5. S. Nageeb Ali & Ayal Chen-Zion & Erik Lillethun, 2020. "Reselling Information," Papers 2004.01788, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2022.
    6. Arin Aguirre, Francisco Javier & Feltkamp, Vicent & Montero García, María, 2013. "Coalitional games with veto players: Myopic and farsighted behavior," IKERLANAK http://www-fae1-eao1-ehu-, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
    7. J. Arin & V. Feltkamp & M. Montero, 2015. "A bargaining procedure leading to the serial rule in games with veto players," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 229(1), pages 41-66, June.
    8. Karavaev, Andrei, 2008. "Information Trading in Social Networks," MPRA Paper 9110, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Polanski, Arnold, 2007. "A decentralized model of information pricing in networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 497-512, September.
    10. Lepp l , Samuli, 2013. "Arrow's paradox and markets for nonproprietary information," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2013/2, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
    11. Hanaki, Nobuyuki & Kayaba, Yutaka & Maekawa, Jun & Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2024. "Two experiments on trading information goods in a network," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 1-18.

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