A Model of Public Consultation: Why is Binary Communication so Common?
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Lundtofte, Frederik & Leoni, Patrick, 2014.
"Growth forecasts, belief manipulation and capital markets,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 108-125.
- Lundtofte, Frederik & Leoni, Patrick, 2010. "Growth Forecasts, Belief Manipulation and Capital Markets," Working Papers 2010:8, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 30 May 2012.
- Lundtofte, Frederik & Leoni, Patrick, 2013. "Growth Forecasts, Belief Manipulation and Capital Markets," Knut Wicksell Working Paper Series 2013/15, Lund University, Knut Wicksell Centre for Financial Studies.
- Pinghan Liang, 2013.
"Exit and Voice: A Game-theoretic Analysis of Customer Complaint Management,"
Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(2), pages 177-207, May.
- Liang, Pinghan, 2013. "Exit and voice: a game-theoretic analysis of customer complaint management," MPRA Paper 45268, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Rosar, Frank, 2015. "Continuous decisions by a committee: Median versus average mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 15-65.
- Junichiro Ishida & Takashi Shimizu, 2009. "Cheap Talk with an Informed Receiver," ISER Discussion Paper 0746r, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Jun 2015.
- Gordon Rausser & Leo Simon & Jinhua Zhao, 2015.
"Rational exaggeration and counter-exaggeration in information aggregation games,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 59(1), pages 109-146, May.
- Rausser, Gordon C & Simon, Leo K & Zhao, Jinhua, 2015. "Rational exaggeration and counter-exaggeration in information aggregation games," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt1dv9r9t4, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
- Patrick Hummel & John Morgan & Phillip C. Stocken, 2013. "A model of flops," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 44(4), pages 585-609, December.
- Karakoç Gülen, 2022. "Cheap Talk with Multiple Experts and Uncertain Biases," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 22(2), pages 527-556, June.
- Junichiro Ishida & Takashi Shimizu, 2019. "Cheap talk when the receiver has uncertain information sources," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 68(2), pages 303-334, September.
- Palfrey, Thomas & Rosenthal, Howard & Roy, Nilanjan, 2017. "How cheap talk enhances efficiency in threshold public goods games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 234-259.
- Kohei Kawamura, 2013. "Confidence and Competence in Communication," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 222, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- Gulen Karakoc, 2020. "Cheap Talk with Multiple Experts and Uncertain Biases," Working Papers 451, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics.
- Kohei Kawamura, 2015. "Confidence and competence in communication," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 78(2), pages 233-259, February.
- Kohei, Kawamura, 2013. "Confidence and Competence in Communication," SIRE Discussion Papers 2013-43, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
- Kawamura, Kohei, 2013. "Eliciting information from a large population," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 44-54.
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