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Labour income uncertainty, taxation and public good provision

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  • Jukka Pirttilä
  • Matti Tuomala

Abstract

This article examines optimal nonlinear income taxation, commodity taxation and public good provision under income uncertainty in a moral hazard framework. Uniform commodity taxation and the Samuelson rule for public good provision are desirable under similar conditions as in the conventional tax model. Deviations from these rules is warranted if one can encourage effort by subsidising certain goods and overproviding public goods. We also determine a rule for the optimal marginal income tax rate and provide some numerical simulations. Conditions for the validity of the solution procedure used in this class of models, the first-order approach, are also explored. Copyright 2007 The Author(s). Journal compilation Royal Economic Society 2007.

Suggested Citation

  • Jukka Pirttilä & Matti Tuomala, 2007. "Labour income uncertainty, taxation and public good provision," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(518), pages 567-582, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:117:y:2007:i:518:p:567-582
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Jukka Pirttilä & Håkan Selin, 2011. "Tax Policy and Employment: How Does the Swedish System Fare," Working Papers 267, Työn ja talouden tutkimus LABORE, The Labour Institute for Economic Research LABORE.
    2. Kaisa Kotakorpi & Jani‐Petri Laamanen, 2010. "Welfare State and Life Satisfaction: Evidence from Public Health Care," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 77(307), pages 565-583, July.
    3. James Sefton & Justin Van De Ven, 2009. "Optimal Design of Means Tested Retirement Benefits," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(541), pages 461-481, November.

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