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Profiling in Bargaining Over College Tuition

Author

Listed:
  • Dennis Epple
  • Richard Romano
  • Sinan Sarpaca
  • Holger Sieg

Abstract

Profiling in college admissions arises when applicant attributes are given weight because they are correlated with unobservable student characteristics that the college values. The article models the admission process of a single college as a bargaining game between the college and a potential student with sequential moves and asymmetric information. We test the empirical implications of this model using a unique data set from a private college in the US. We find that the empirical evidence is consistent with the notion that signalling and profiling are important aspects of the college admission process. Copyright 2006 The Author(s). Journal compilation Royal Economic Society 2006.

Suggested Citation

  • Dennis Epple & Richard Romano & Sinan Sarpaca & Holger Sieg, 2006. "Profiling in Bargaining Over College Tuition," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(515), pages 459-479, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:116:y:2006:i:515:p:f459-f479
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Liu, Liqun & Neilson, William S., 2011. "High scores but low skills," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 507-516, June.
    2. Kolpin, Van & Stater, Mark, 2024. "The perverse equilibrium effects of state and federal student aid in higher education," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 217(C), pages 679-691.
    3. Sarpça, Sinan, 2010. "Multi-dimensional skills, specialization, and oligopolistic competition in higher education," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(9-10), pages 800-811, October.
    4. Dennis Epple & Richard Romano & Sinan Sarpça & Holger Sieg, 2013. "The U.S. Market for Higher Education: A General Equilibrium Analysis of State and Private Colleges and Public Funding Policies," NBER Working Papers 19298, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Heather Antecol & Janet Kiholm Smith, 2012. "The Early Decision Option in College Admission and Its Impact on Student Diversity," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 55(1), pages 217-249.
    6. John A. Karikari & Hashem Dezhbakhsh, 2013. "Are selective private and public colleges affordable?," Education Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(1), pages 60-78, February.
    7. Sevilla, Almudena & Borra, Cristina, 2015. "Parental Time Investments in Children: The Role of Competition for University Places in the UK," IZA Discussion Papers 9168, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).

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