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On the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the imputation set

Author

Listed:
  • Francesc Llerena

    (Universitat Rovira i Virgili)

  • Llúcia Mauri

    (Universitat Rovira i Virgili)

Abstract

In this note we introduce the Lorenz stable set and provide an axiomatic characterization in terms of constrained egalitarianism and projection consistency. On the domain of all coalitional games, we find that this solution connects the weak constrained egalitarian solution (Dutta and Ray, 1989) with their strong counterpart (Dutta and Ray, 1991).

Suggested Citation

  • Francesc Llerena & Llúcia Mauri, 2015. "On the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the imputation set," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 35(4), pages 2475-2481.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-15-00652
    as

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    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2015/Volume35/EB-15-V35-I4-P248.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dutta, Bhaskar & Ray, Debraj, 1989. "A Concept of Egalitarianism under Participation Constraints," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 615-635, May.
    2. Francesc Llerena & Carles Rafels, 2007. "Convex decomposition of games and axiomatizations of the core and the D-core," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 35(4), pages 603-615, April.
    3. Jens Leth Hougaard & Lars Thorlund-Petersen & Bezalel Peleg, 2001. "On the set of Lorenz-maximal imputations in the core of a balanced game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 30(2), pages 147-165.
    4. Anindya Bhattacharya, 2004. "On the equal division core," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 22(2), pages 391-399, April.
    5. Javier Arin & Elena Inarra, 2001. "Egalitarian solutions in the core," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 30(2), pages 187-193.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Llerena, Francesc & Mauri, Llúcia, 2017. "On the existence of the Dutta–Ray’s egalitarian solution," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 92-99.
    2. Llerena Garrés, Francesc & Mauri Masdeu, Llúcia, 2016. "On the existence of the Dutta-Ray’s egalitarian solution," Working Papers 2072/266573, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    cooperative games; Lorenz domination; imputation set;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

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