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A note on asset specificity

Author

Listed:
  • Roland Bel

    (Kedge Business School)

Abstract

In this note, we discuss the theoretical formulation of the concept of specificity and expose preliminary results showing that different types of asset specificity call for the use of different control rights. Contrary to transaction cost and property right theories, but in line with increasing empirical evidence, high levels of specificity do not necessarily lead to unified ownership.

Suggested Citation

  • Roland Bel, 2015. "A note on asset specificity," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 35(3), pages 1645-1651.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-15-00049
    as

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    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2015/Volume35/EB-15-V35-I3-P165.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Roland Bel, 2013. "Access, Veto, and Ownership in the Theory of the Firm," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 29(4), pages 871-897, August.
    2. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 1998. "Power in a Theory of the Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 113(2), pages 387-432.
    3. Ilya Segal, 2003. "Collusion, Exclusion, and Inclusion in Random-Order Bargaining," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 70(2), pages 439-460.
    4. Ilya Segal & Michael D. Whinston, 2000. "Exclusive Contracts and Protection of Investments," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(4), pages 603-633, Winter.
    5. Williamson, Oliver E, 1983. "Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 519-540, September.
    6. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-1158, December.
    7. Hart, Oliver, 1995. "Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198288817.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Asset specificity; property rights; control rights; incomplete contracts;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
    • L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior

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