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Aggregating quasi-transitive preferences: a note

Author

Listed:
  • Dan Qin

    (Graduate school of economics, Waseda University)

Abstract

To examine the consequences of allowing individual to violate full rationality in collective decision making, this article discusses the possibility of aggregating quasi-transitive preferences in the Arrovian framework. Quasi-transitive valued aggregating functions are discussed and characterised. A characterisation of the weak Pareto extension rule is also achieved as a corollary.

Suggested Citation

  • Dan Qin, 2014. "Aggregating quasi-transitive preferences: a note," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 34(2), pages 976-983.
  • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-13-00835
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. John Weymark, 1984. "Arrow's theorem with social quasi-orderings," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 42(3), pages 235-246, January.
    2. Plott, Charles R, 1973. "Path Independence, Rationality, and Social Choice," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(6), pages 1075-1091, November.
    3. Andreu Mas-Colell & Hugo Sonnenschein, 1972. "General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 39(2), pages 185-192.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    preference aggregation; quasi-transitivity; veto power; Weak Pareto extension rule;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

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