Does being elected increase subjective entitlements? Evidence from the laboratory
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Other versions of this item:
- Arne Robert Weiss & Irenaeus Wolff, 2013. "Does being Elected Increase Subjective Entitlements? Evidence from the Laboratory," Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz 2013-19, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
- Arne Robert Weiss & Irenaeus Wolff, 2013. "Does being elected increase subjective entitlements? Evidence from the laboratory," TWI Research Paper Series 82, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz.
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Cited by:
- Urs Fischbacher & Simeon Schudy, 2014.
"Reciprocity and resistance to comprehensive reform,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 160(3), pages 411-428, September.
- Urs Fischbacher & Simeon Schudy, 2010. "Reciprocity and Resistance to Comprehensive Reform," TWI Research Paper Series 51, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz.
- Fischbacher, Urs & Schudy, Simeon, 2013. "Reciprocity and resistance to comprehensive reform," Munich Reprints in Economics 20337, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Gaudeul, Alexia & Keser, Claudia, 2017.
"The social preferences of democratically elected decision makers and the conflict between wealth generation and distribution,"
University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics
327, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
- Alexia Gaudeul & Claudia Keser, 2017. "The social preferences of democratically elected decision makers and the conflict between wealth generation and distribution," CIRANO Working Papers 2017s-25, CIRANO.
- Kaisa Herne & Olli Lappalainen & Maija Setälä & Juha Ylisalo, 2022. "Accountability as a Warrant for Trust: An Experiment on Sanctions and Justifications in a Trust Game," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 93(4), pages 615-648, November.
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Keywords
Elections; Electoral campaigns; Dictator game; Social distance; Experiment;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
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