IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ebl/ecbull/eb-10-00309.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Heterogeneity in a Class of Two-Player Games

Author

Listed:
  • Charles Figuières

    (INRA - LAMETA)

  • Frédéric Rychen

    (GREQAM - IDEP, University of the Mediterranean)

Abstract

In two-player games with negative (positive) spillovers it is well-known that symmetric agents both overact (underact) at the Nash equilibria. We show that for heterogeneous agents this rule of thumb has to be amended if the game features strategic substitutability.

Suggested Citation

  • Charles Figuières & Frédéric Rychen, 2011. "Heterogeneity in a Class of Two-Player Games," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 31(1), pages 426-435.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-10-00309
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2011/Volume31/EB-11-V31-I1-P41.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Wilson, John Douglas, 1991. "Tax competition with interregional differences in factor endowments," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 423-451, November.
    2. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, April.
    3. Bulow, Jeremy I & Geanakoplos, John D & Klemperer, Paul D, 1985. "Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 488-511, June.
    4. Helm, Carsten, 2003. "International emissions trading with endogenous allowance choices," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(12), pages 2737-2747, December.
    5. Nick Hanley & Henk Folmer (ed.), 1998. "Game Theory and the Environment," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1083.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Lau, Sau-Him Paul, 2001. "Aggregate Pattern of Time-dependent Adjustment Rules, II: Strategic Complementarity and Endogenous Nonsynchronization," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 98(2), pages 199-231, June.
    2. Bagwell, Kyle & Wolinsky, Asher, 2002. "Game theory and industrial organization," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 49, pages 1851-1895, Elsevier.
    3. Kempf, Hubert & Rota-Graziosi, Grégoire, 2010. "Endogenizing leadership in tax competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(9-10), pages 768-776, October.
    4. Bagchi, Aniruddha & Roy, Abhra, 2011. "Endogenous R&D and Intellectual Property Laws in Developed and Emerging Economies," MPRA Paper 31822, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Haufler, Andreas & Pflüger, Michael, 2003. "Market structure and the taxation of international trade," Discussion Papers in Economics 106, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    6. Ya‐chin Wang & Leonard F.s. Wang, 2009. "Equivalence Of Competition Mode In A Vertically Differentiated Duopoly With Delegation," South African Journal of Economics, Economic Society of South Africa, vol. 77(4), pages 577-590, December.
    7. Gong, Zhenwei & Zhang, Fangni & Liu, Wei & Graham, Daniel J., 2023. "On the effects of airport capacity expansion under responsive airlines and elastic passenger demand," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 170(C), pages 48-76.
    8. Esther Gal‐Or, 1992. "Job Securityand Product Market Competition," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(2), pages 313-337, June.
    9. Gerda Dewit & Dermot Leahy, 2009. "Oligopsonistic Cats and Dogs," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 35(3), pages 257-274, November.
    10. Davide Vannoni, 2000. "The diversifield firm: non formal theories versus formal models," ECONOMIA E POLITICA INDUSTRIALE, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2000(106).
    11. Kresimir Zigic & Jiri Strelicky & Michal Kunin, 2020. "Private and Public IPR Protection in a Vertically Differentiated Software Duopoly," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp671, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    12. Aniruddha Bagchi & Abhra Roy, 2012. "Endogenous Research and Development and Intellectual Property Laws in Developed and Emerging Economies," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 78(3), pages 895-930, January.
    13. Gérard Mondello, 2022. "Strict liability, scarce generic input and duopoly competition," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 54(3), pages 369-404, December.
    14. Hamilton, Stephen F. & Bontems, Philippe & Lepore, Jason, 2015. "Oligopoly intermediation, relative rivalry and market conduct," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 49-59.
    15. Federico Etro, 2010. "Endogenous market structures and antitrust policy," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 57(1), pages 9-45, March.
    16. Jean LEFOLL & Stylianos PERRAKIS, 2002. "Financial Structure and Market Equilibrium in a Vertically Differentiated Industry," FAME Research Paper Series rp96, International Center for Financial Asset Management and Engineering.
    17. Chen, Yongmin & Rosenthal, Robert W., 1996. "Dynamic duopoly with slowly changing customer loyalties," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 269-296, May.
    18. Nilssen,T. & Sorgard,L., 2001. "The TV industry : advertising and programming," Memorandum 18/2001, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    19. Angela S. Bergantino & Etienne Billette de Villemeur & Annalisa Vinella, 2006. "A Model of Partial Regulation in the Maritime Ferry Industry," SERIES 0010, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza - Università degli Studi di Bari "Aldo Moro", revised Jan 2006.
    20. Hattori Keisuke & Lin Ming-Hsin, 2011. "Alliance Partner Choice in Markets with Vertical and Horizontal Externalities," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-27, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    heterogeneity; over(under)-investment; strategic complementarity; strategic substitutability; two-player games;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-10-00309. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: John P. Conley (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.