Vertical mergers that eliminate double markups are procompetitive
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Keywords
Vertical integration;JEL classification:
- D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
- L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
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