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Equilibrium Existence in Bipartite Social Games: A Generalization of Stable Matchings

Author

Listed:
  • Matthew Jackson

    (Stanford University)

  • Alison Watts

    (Southern Illinois University)

Abstract

We prove existence of equilibria in bipartite social games, where players choose both a strategy in a game and a partner with whom to play the game. Such social games generalize the well-known marriage problem where players choose partners but do not take actions subsequent to matching.

Suggested Citation

  • Matthew Jackson & Alison Watts, 2008. "Equilibrium Existence in Bipartite Social Games: A Generalization of Stable Matchings," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(12), pages 1-8.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-08c70003
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Jackson, Matthew O. & Watts, Alison, 2010. "Social games: Matching and the play of finitely repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 170-191, September.
    2. Zhou Kit, 2023. "Choosing Sides in a Two-Sided Matching Market," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 23(2), pages 781-807, June.
    3. Berninghaus, Siegfried K. & Ehrhart, Karl-Martin & Ott, Marion, 2012. "Forward-looking behavior in Hawk–Dove games in endogenous networks: Experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 35-52.
    4. Schumacher, Heiner, 2013. "Imitating cooperation and the formation of long-term relationships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(1), pages 409-417.
    5. Gilles, Robert P. & Lazarova, Emiliya A. & Ruys, Pieter H.M., 2015. "Stability in a network economy: The role of institutions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 375-399.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Social Games;

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • A1 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics

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