IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ebl/ecbull/eb-02h20003.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Rawlsian governments and the race to the bottom

Author

Listed:
  • Jean-Marie Lozachmeur

    (CREPP Université de Liège and CORE)

  • Pierre Pestieau

    (CREPP Université de Liège, CORE, DELTA and CEPR)

  • Jon Hamilton

    (Department of Economics, University of Florida)

Abstract

This paper argues that there is no race to the bottom when the social planner adopts a Rawlsian criterion, only the poor are mobile and they do not work at the optimal tax outcome. This argument is developed within a two skill-model of optimal income taxation.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-Marie Lozachmeur & Pierre Pestieau & Jon Hamilton, 2002. "Rawlsian governments and the race to the bottom," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 8(2), pages 1-6.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-02h20003
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/EB/2002/Volume8/EB-02H20003A.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gwenael Piaser, 2003. "Labor Mobility and Income Tax Competition," Public Economics 0302002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Jonathan Hamilton & Pierre Pestieau, 2005. "Optimal Income Taxation and the Ability Distribution: Implications for Migration Equilibria," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 12(1), pages 29-45, January.
    3. David E. Wildasin, 1994. "Income Redistribution and Migration," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 27(3), pages 637-656, August.
    4. Gahvari, Firouz, 1989. "The nature of government expenditures and the shape of the laffer curve," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 251-260, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Bierbrauer, Felix & Brett, Craig & Weymark, John A., 2013. "Strategic nonlinear income tax competition with perfect labor mobility," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 292-311.
    2. Áron Tóbiás, 2015. "Income Redistribution in Open Economies," CESifo Working Paper Series 5378, CESifo.
    3. Michel Poitevin, 2018. "Concurrence fiscale et biens publics," CIRANO Project Reports 2018rp-09, CIRANO.
    4. Jonathan Hamilton & Pierre Pestieau, 2005. "Optimal Income Taxation and the Ability Distribution: Implications for Migration Equilibria," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 12(1), pages 29-45, January.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Blumkin, Tomer & Sadka, Efraim & Shem-Tov, Yotam, 2011. "Labor Migration and the Case for Flat Tax," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 275759, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research.
    2. Tomer Blumkin & Efraim Sadka & Yotam Shem-Tov, 2011. "Labor Migration and the Case for Flat Tax," CESifo Working Paper Series 3471, CESifo.
    3. Áron Tóbiás, 2015. "Income Redistribution in Open Economies," CESifo Working Paper Series 5378, CESifo.
    4. Jean Gabszewicz & Ornella Tarola & Skerdilajda Zanaj, 2016. "Migration, wages and income taxes," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 23(3), pages 434-453, June.
    5. Bierbrauer, Felix & Brett, Craig & Weymark, John A., 2013. "Strategic nonlinear income tax competition with perfect labor mobility," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 292-311.
    6. Mathilde Muñoz, 2021. "Do European Top Earners React to Labour Taxation Through Migration ?," PSE Working Papers halshs-03252899, HAL.
    7. Mathilde Munoz, 2019. "Do European Top Earners React to Labour Taxation Through Migration ?," PSE Working Papers hal-02876987, HAL.
    8. Laurent Simula & Alain Trannoy, 2012. "Shall we keep the highly skilled at home? The optimal income tax perspective," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 39(4), pages 751-782, October.
    9. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:8:y:2002:i:2:p:1-6 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Etienne Lehmann & Laurent Simula & Alain Trannoy, 2014. "Tax me if you can! Optimal Nonlinear Income Tax Between Competing Governments," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 129(4), pages 1995-2030.
    11. Mathilde Munoz, 2019. "Do European Top Earners React to Labour Taxation Through Migration ?," World Inequality Lab Working Papers hal-02876987, HAL.
    12. Blumkin, Tomer & Sadka, Efraim & Shem-Tov, Yotam, 2012. "Labor Migration and the Case for Flat Tax," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 275771, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research.
    13. Laurent Simula, 2013. "Tax Competition and Migration," 2013 Meeting Papers 1126, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    14. Mathilde Munoz, 2019. "Do European Top Earners React to Labour Taxation Through Migration ?," Working Papers hal-02876987, HAL.
    15. Mathilde Muñoz, 2021. "Do European Top Earners React to Labour Taxation Through Migration ?," Working Papers halshs-03252899, HAL.
    16. Yoram Weiss & Robert M. Sauer & Menachem Gotlibovski, 2003. "Immigration, Search, and Loss of Skill," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(3), pages 557-592, July.
    17. Massimo Morelli & Huanxing Yang & Lixin Ye, 2012. "Competitive Nonlinear Taxation and Constitutional Choice," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 142-175, February.
    18. Brett, Craig & Weymark, John A., 2011. "How optimal nonlinear income taxes change when the distribution of the population changes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(11), pages 1239-1247.
    19. Cremer, Helmuth & Pestieau, Pierre, 1998. "Social insurance, majority voting and labor mobility," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(3), pages 397-420, June.
    20. Dinkelman, Taryn & Schulhofer-Wohl, Sam, 2015. "Migration, congestion externalities, and the evaluation of spatial investments," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 189-202.
    21. Benjamin Elsner & Jeff Concannon, 2020. "Immigration and Redistribution," Working Papers 202024, School of Economics, University College Dublin.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Income taxation;

    JEL classification:

    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-02h20003. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: John P. Conley (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.