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From social choice functions to dictatorial social welfare functions

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  • Antonio Quesada

    (Universidad de Murcia)

Abstract

A procedure to construct a social welfare function from a social choice function is suggested and it is shown that the dictatorial are the only unanimous social welfare functions that can be reconstructed from a social choice function that does not change the social choice when a defeated alternative is moved to the last position in all the individual preferences.

Suggested Citation

  • Antonio Quesada, 2002. "From social choice functions to dictatorial social welfare functions," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(16), pages 1-7.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-02d70006
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    5. Saari,Donald G., 2001. "Decisions and Elections," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521004046, November.
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    7. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
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    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

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