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Die Europäische Zentralbank als Lender of Last Resort

Author

Listed:
  • Gerhard Illing
  • Philipp König

Abstract

In the wake of the recent European debt crisis, the European Central Bank (ECB) has grown significantly in importance. As the crisis worsened, especially in the southern countries of the euro area, the ECB was forced to take measures which went far beyond its monetary policy operations in normal times - particularly with respect to its function as the lender of last resort. The ECB provided the banking sector with almost unlimited liquidity and, in addition, purchased government bonds of distressed countries outright. Eventually, in the summer of 2012, it followed through on its promise to do everything possible to save the euro as a common currency. This announcement temporarily stabilized financial markets and the countries in crisis. Nevertheless, compared to other central banks, the ECB is inhibited in its scope of activities: unlike, for example, the US Federal Reserve (Fed), the European Central Bank has no well-defined institutionally anchored financial backing. Consequently, the measures it can take are limited by the maximum loss it can incur. This also means that the ECB must protect itself more than other central banks against any financial risks from its monetary policy operations. In particular, during a crisis, this restricts its scope for taking measures to fulfill its mandate-securing price stability. Additionly, the ECB has taken on the role of lender of last resort for governments with its announcement in the fall of 2012 to purchase government bonds of distressed countries in the euro area, if necessary, and under strict conditions. It was forced to do so because the euro area did not have a corresponding institution capable of stopping the crisis worsening and preventing a break-up of the monetary union. At the same time, however, it is indeed questionable whether the ECB has a mandate for this role. The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) would, in principle, be better suited to act as the lender of last resort for governments should future crises occur. However, it must be given access to ECB credit in order to fully perform this function Die Europäische Zentralbank (EZB) hat im Zuge der europäischen Schuldenkrise in den vergangenen Jahren massiv an Bedeutung gewonnen. Der sich zuspitzende Verlauf der Krise vor allem in den südlichen Ländern des Euroraums zwang die EZB zu Maßnahmen, die die geldpolitischen Aktivitäten einer Notenbank während ruhigerer Zeiten weit überschritten - besonders in ihrer Funktion als Lender of Last Resort (Kreditgeber letzter Instanz). So stellte die EZB dem Bankensektor nahezu unbegrenzt Liquidität zur Verfügung und kaufte Staatsanleihen der Krisenländer. Schließlich folgte im Sommer des Jahres 2012 das Versprechen, im Rahmen ihres Mandats alles zu tun, um den Euro als gemeinsame Währung zu retten. Diese Ankündigung stabilisierte die Finanzmärkte und Krisenstaaten vorläufig. Dennoch ist die EZB im Vergleich zu anderen Notenbanken in ihren Aktivitäten gehemmt: Anders als etwa die US-amerikanische Federal Reserve hat die Europäische Zentralbank keinen institutionell verankerten fiskalischen Rückhalt. Ihre Maßnahmen sind daher durch die maximalen Verluste, die sie selbst schultern kann, begrenzt. Das bedeutet auch, dass sich die EZB in deutlich stärkerem Maße als andere Zentralbanken gegen etwaige finanzielle Risiken aus ihren geldpolitischen Geschäften absichern muss. Insbesondere während einer Krise schränkt dies ihren Handlungsspielraum bei der Erfüllung ihres Mandats - die Sicherung der Preisstabilität - ein. Darüber hinaus hat die EZB mit der Ankündigung, gegebenenfalls und gegen strikte Auflagen Staatsanleihen von Krisenländern des Euroraums zu erwerben, auch die Rolle eines Lender of Last Resort für Staaten übernommen. Sie sah sich dazu genötigt, da der Euroraum nicht über eine entsprechende Institution verfügte, die gleichermaßen in der Lage gewesen wäre, eine Zuspitzung der Krise und die Gefahr eines Auseinanderbrechens der Währungsunion zu vermeiden. Gleichzeitig ist jedoch fraglich, ob die EZB das Mandat für diese Rolle besitzt. Der Europäische Stabilitätsmechanismus wäre zwar grundsätzlich prädestiniert, in künftigen Krisen als Lender of Last Resort für Staaten aufzutreten, muss jedoch, um diese Funktion voll ausfüllen zu können, Zugang zu Krediten der EZB erhalten.

Suggested Citation

  • Gerhard Illing & Philipp König, 2014. "Die Europäische Zentralbank als Lender of Last Resort," DIW Wochenbericht, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 81(24), pages 541-554.
  • Handle: RePEc:diw:diwwob:81-24-3
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    File URL: https://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.466589.de/14-24-3.pdf
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Peter Spahn, 2016. "Central Bank Design in a Non-optimal Currency Union A Lender of Last Resort for Government Debt?," ROME Working Papers 201610, ROME Network.
    2. Jakob Korbinian Eberl, 2016. "The Collateral Framework of the Eurosystem and Its Fiscal Implications," ifo Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsforschung, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, number 69.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Central Banking; Lender of Last Resort; Monetary Policy; EuropeanMonetary Union; Banking Crises;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • F36 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Financial Aspects of Economic Integration

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