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Die Verschuldungskrise der Europäischen Währungsunion: fiskalische Disziplinlosigkeit oder Konstruktionsfehler?

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  • Rainer Maurer

Abstract

This paper presents empirical arguments that the debt crisis of the European Monetary Union is not primarily a sovereign debt crisis but a foreign debt crisis of entire countries. The empirical evidence suggests furthermore that the strong increase in the net international debt position of Greece, Ireland, Spain and Portugal was caused by real interest rates, which were significantly lower as in the other EMU countries. The reasons for these lower real interest rates have been lasting inflation differentials in the presence of converging nominal interest rates. The paper shows, how such inflation differentials can lead to self-enforcing debt spirals, if not all goods are tradable. The economic policy conclusion from these findings is that the European Central Bank must receive instruments to differentiate country-specific nominal interest rates in order to prevent such debt-spirals in the future. In diesem Artikel wird auf der Basis empirischer Daten argumentiert, dass die Schuldenkrise der Europäischen Währungsunion entgegen verbreiteter Ansicht nicht von einem starken Anstieg der Schuldenstandsquote von Staaten, sondern von einem starken Anstieg der Nettoauslandsverschuldungsquote von Ländern verursacht wurde. Die Zahlen sprechen außerdem dafür, dass die hohe Nettoauslandsverschuldung von Griechenland, Irland, Spanien und Portugal vor allem deshalb entstanden ist, weil die Realzinsen in diesen Ländern deutlich niedriger waren als die Realzinsen in den anderen Mitgliedsländern der Europäischen Währungsunion. Verursacht wurden die niedrigen Realzinsen durch die mit dem Beginn der Währungsunion einsetzende Konvergenz der Nominalzinsen bei weitgehendem Fortbestand der Inflationsdifferenzen. Der Artikel zeigt, dass unter solchen Umständen sich selbst verstärkende Verschuldungsspiralen entstehen können, wenn nicht alle Güter handelbar sind. Die wirtschaftspolitische Schlussfolgerung lautet, dass die Europäische Zentralbank Instrumente zur länderspezifischen Differenzierung der Nominalzinsen erhalten muss, um solche Verschuldungsspiralen in Zukunft zu verhindern.

Suggested Citation

  • Rainer Maurer, 2010. "Die Verschuldungskrise der Europäischen Währungsunion: fiskalische Disziplinlosigkeit oder Konstruktionsfehler?," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 79(4), pages 85-102.
  • Handle: RePEc:diw:diwvjh:79-4-7
    DOI: 10.3790/vjh.79.4.85
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Klodt, Henning, 2011. "Ist die Währungsunion zu retten? Für einen anreizeffizienten Krisenmechanismus," Kiel Working Papers 1690, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    2. Smeets Heinz-Dieter & Schmid Anita, 2014. "Europäische Staatsschuldenkrise, Lender of last resort und Bankenunion / European sovereign debt crisis, lender of last resort and banking union," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 65(1), pages 47-74, January.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    EMU-debt crisis; currency union; debt spiral; monetary policy; fiscal policy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory

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