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Der Einfluss der Arzthonorierung auf die Anwendung neuer Techniken

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  • Astrid Selder

Abstract

This study analyses the adequate reimbursement of new medical technology in a world with ex post moral hazard. While the physician chooses the technology and offers it to the patient, the patient in turn chooses the optimal amount of health care. It turns out that what at first seems to be desirable technological progress, reducing treatment costs or advancing modern medical technology, may not actually increase patients' welfare. A comparison of cost reimbursement, fee-for-service and prospective payment shows that the patient's demand response may have surprising implications for the physician's incentives with respect to technology choice: if demand responds elastically with respect to monetary costs, the physician has, for instance, under prospective payment a tendency to choose more costly technologies. The analysis also allows a classification of technologies according to their characteristics to the above payment systems. Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht die adäquate Vergütung von neuer Medizintechnik in einer Situation, in der der Patient Ex-post-Moral-Hazard ausübt. Während der Arzt die Behandlungstechnik vorschlägt, wählt der Patient im Anschluss die für ihn optimale Menge an Behandlung. Es zeigt sich, dass eine Technologie, die auf den ersten Blick eine erwünschte Innovation darstellt, weil sie die Behandlungskosten senkt oder eine bessere Heilung der Krankheit ermöglicht, nicht notwendigerweise ex ante den Nutzen des Patienten erhöht. Bei einem Vergleich der Vergütungssysteme Kostenerstattung, Einzelleistungsvergütung und prospektive Vergütung wird deutlich, dass die Mengenreaktion des Patienten mitunter überraschende Anreize für die Technologiewahl des Arztes bewirkt: Bei einer elastischen Reaktion der Nachfrage in Bezug auf monetäre Kosten zeigt der Arzt z. B. bei prospektiver Vergütung eine Tendenz zu kostenintensiverer Technologie. Des Weiteren ermöglicht die Analyse eine Zuordnung von Technologien anhand ihrer Charakteristika zu obigen Vergütungssystemen.

Suggested Citation

  • Astrid Selder, 2004. "Der Einfluss der Arzthonorierung auf die Anwendung neuer Techniken," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 73(4), pages 579-588.
  • Handle: RePEc:diw:diwvjh:73-40-10
    DOI: 10.3790/vjh.73.4.579
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    1. James R. Baumgardner, 1991. "The Interaction between Forms of Insurance Contract and Types of Technical Change in Medical Care," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(1), pages 36-53, Spring.
    2. Cutler, David M. & Zeckhauser, Richard J., 2000. "The anatomy of health insurance," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 11, pages 563-643, Elsevier.
    3. Selder, Astrid, 2005. "Physician reimbursement and technology adoption," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(5), pages 907-930, September.
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