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Les options sur actions:création de richesse pour les actionnaires ou enrichissement des dirigeants au détriment des actionnaires?

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  • Michel Magnan

    (Université Concordia (Canada))

Abstract

(VF)Pour l’essentiel, l’argumentation sous-tendant l’utilisation des options met en avant leur rôle dans le rapprochement des intérêts des dirigeants et des actionnaires. Les premières études empiriques sur la question confortent cet argument en montrant un lien positif entre l’adoption de régimes d’options et la performance de l’entreprise. Toutefois, des constats plus récents remettent en cause plusieurs postulats sous-tendant l’efficacité présumée des options en raison, notamment, de la possibilité qu’ont les dirigeants de manipuler, directement ou indirectement, le cours boursier. Cette marge discrétionnaire qu’ont les dirigeants dans leurs communications avec les investisseurs semble avoir été utilisée aux dépens des actionnaires dans plusieurs cas. Enfin, nous présentons nos conclusions et recommandations.(VA)The most often used rationale to justify the use of stock options is that they help align managerial interests with those of stockholders. Early results on the issue of stock options effectiveness were generally consistent with the view that stock options’ use and adoption led to improvements in firm performance. However, most recent results cast a shadow on the validity of these findings. More specifically, there is emerging evidence that in many firms, managers used their discretionary power to manipulate disclosure and financial reporting to unduly manipulate their firm’s stock price. Cases of companies that engaged into these unethical practices are reviewed and discussed. I conclude with some recommendations regarding the use and management of stock option plans.

Suggested Citation

  • Michel Magnan, 2006. "Les options sur actions:création de richesse pour les actionnaires ou enrichissement des dirigeants au détriment des actionnaires?," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 9(3), pages 221-235, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:9:y:2006:i:q3:p:221-235
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Timothy Fogarty & Michel Magnan & Garen Markarian & Serge Bohdjalian, 2009. "Inside Agency: The Rise and Fall of Nortel," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 84(2), pages 165-187, January.
    2. Yermack, David, 1997. "Good Timing: CEO Stock Option Awards and Company News Announcements," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 449-476, June.
    3. Hanlon, Michelle & Rajgopal, Shivaram & Shevlin, Terry, 2003. "Are executive stock options associated with future earnings?," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(1-3), pages 3-43, December.
    4. Stephen O'Byrne & David Young, 2005. "Top Management Incentives and Corporate Performance," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 17(4), pages 105-114, September.
    5. Rajgopal, Shivaram & Shevlin, Terry, 2002. "Empirical evidence on the relation between stock option compensation and risk taking," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 145-171, June.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Michel Magnan, 2009. "Fair Value Accounting and the Financial Crisis: Messenger or Contributor?," CIRANO Working Papers 2009s-27, CIRANO.
    2. Michel L. Magnan, 2009. "Fair Value Accounting and the Financial Crisis: Messenger or Contributor?," Accounting Perspectives, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 8(3), pages 189-213, August.
    3. Guillaume Garnotel & Patrick Loux, 2008. "Politiques de rémunération des dirigeants et investissements liés à l'innovation dans les industries de haute technologie," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 11(4), pages 65-85, December.
    4. Aurélien Eminet & Zied Guedri & Stefan Asseman, 2009. "Le dirigeant est-il l’architecte de sa rémunération? Structure de contrôle du conseil d’administration et mobilisation du capital social," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 12(3), pages 5-36, September.
    5. Robert Amzallag & Michel Magnan & Bryan Campbell, 2009. "A Banker's Perspective on the Financial Crisis," CIRANO Burgundy Reports 2009rb-02, CIRANO.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    options sur actions; rémunération; dirigeants; gouvernance; performance; reporting; stock options; executive compensation; governance; organizational performance; corporate disclosure and reporting.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • M14 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Corporate Culture; Diversity; Social Responsibility
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • J38 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Public Policy
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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