Revisiting Adjusted ADA Scores for the U.S. Congress, 1947–2007
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- Jo Thori Lind & Dominic Rohner, 2017.
"Knowledge is Power: A Theory of Information, Income and Welfare Spending,"
Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 84(336), pages 611-646, October.
- Lind, J.T. & Rohner, D., 2011. "Knowledge is power: A theory of information, income and welfare spending," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1161, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Jo Thori Lind & Dominic Rohner, 2011. "Knowledge is power: a theory of information, income, and welfare spending," ECON - Working Papers 036, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
- Jo Thori Lind & Dominic Rohner, 2011. "Knowledge is Power - A Theory of Information, Income, and Welfare Spending," CESifo Working Paper Series 3613, CESifo.
- Lind, Jo Thori & Rhoner, Dominic, 2011. "Knowledge is Power: A Theory of Information, Income, and Welfare Spending," Memorandum 26/2011, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- Jo Thori Lind & Dominic Rohner, 2013. "Knowledge is power - A theory of information, income, and welfare spending," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 13.07, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
- Jin-Hyuk Kim, 2013.
"Determinants of post-congressional lobbying employment,"
Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 107-126, May.
- Kim, Jin-Hyuk, 2012. "Determinants of Post-congressional Lobbying Employment," MPRA Paper 82375, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Schelker, Mark, 2018.
"Lame ducks and divided government: How voters control the unaccountable,"
Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 131-144.
- Schelker, Mark, 2011. "Lame Ducks and Divided Government: How Voters Control the Unaccountable," Economics Working Paper Series 1130, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science, revised Mar 2012.
- Mark Schelker, 2011. "Lame Ducks and Divided Government: How Voters Control the Unaccountable," CESifo Working Paper Series 3523, CESifo.
- Schelker, Mark, 2012.
"Auditor expertise: Evidence from the public sector,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(3), pages 432-435.
- Mark Schelker, 2009. "Auditor Expertise: Evidence from the Public Sector," CREMA Working Paper Series 2009-20, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
- Marta Crispino & Matteo Alpino, 2022. "The role of majority status in close elections studies," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 1391, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
- Andrew C. Chang & Linda R. Cohen & Amihai Glazer & Urbashee Paul, 2021. "Politicians Avoid Tax Increases Around Elections," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2021-004, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Fidel Perez‐Sebastian & Ohad Raveh, 2019.
"Federal tax policies, congressional voting and natural resources,"
Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 52(3), pages 1112-1164, August.
- Fidel Perez-Sebastian & Ohad Raveh, 2019. "Federal tax policies, congressional voting and natural resources," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 52(3), pages 1112-1164, August.
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