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UK OC OK? Interpreting Optimal Classification Scores for the U.K. House of Commons

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  • Spirling, Arthur
  • McLean, Iain

Abstract

Poole's (2000, Non-parametric unfolding of binary choice data. Political Analysis 8:211–37) nonparametric Optimal Classification procedure for binary data produces misleading rank orderings when applied to the modern House of Commons. With simulations and qualitative evidence, we show that the problem arises from the government-versus-opposition nature of British (Westminster) parliamentary politics and the strategic voting that is entailed therein. We suggest that political scientists think seriously about strategic voting in legislatures when interpreting results from such techniques.

Suggested Citation

  • Spirling, Arthur & McLean, Iain, 2007. "UK OC OK? Interpreting Optimal Classification Scores for the U.K. House of Commons," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 15(1), pages 85-96, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:polals:v:15:y:2007:i:01:p:85-96_00
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    Cited by:

    1. William B. Heller & Carol Mershon, 2008. "Dealing in Discipline: Party Switching and Legislative Voting in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, 1988–2000," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 52(4), pages 910-925, October.
    2. Jeong-Hun Han, 2007. "Analysing Roll Calls of the European Parliament," European Union Politics, , vol. 8(4), pages 479-507, December.
    3. Paula Clerici, 2021. "Legislative Territorialization: The Impact of a Decentralized Party System on Individual Legislative Behavior in Argentina," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 51(1), pages 104-130.
    4. Zoltán Fazekas & Martin Ejnar Hansen, 2022. "Incentives for non-participation: absence in the United Kingdom House of Commons, 1997–2015," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 191(1), pages 51-73, April.
    5. Simon Hug & Richard Lukács, 2014. "Preferences or blocs? Voting in the United Nations Human Rights Council," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 83-106, March.
    6. Christopher Hare & Keith T. Poole, 2015. "Measuring ideology in Congress," Chapters, in: Jac C. Heckelman & Nicholas R. Miller (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Voting, chapter 18, pages 327-346, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    7. Joshua B. Fischman, 2011. "Estimating Preferences of Circuit Judges: A Model of Consensus Voting," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(4), pages 781-809.
    8. Chitralekha Basu & Carles Boix & Sonia Giurumescu & Paulo Serôdio, 2022. "Democratizing from Within: British Elites and the Expansion of the Franchise," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 139, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    9. Joshua Lilley & Stuart Townley, 2024. "Tackling transparency in UK politics: application of large language models to clustering and classification of UK parliamentary divisions," Journal of Computational Social Science, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 2563-2589, December.
    10. Eitan Tzelgov, 2014. "Cross-cutting issues, intraparty dissent and party strategy: The issue of European integration in the House of Commons," European Union Politics, , vol. 15(1), pages 3-23, March.

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