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Imperfect Enforcement, Foreign Investment, And Foreign Aid

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  • Asiedu, Elizabeth
  • Villamil, Anne P.

Abstract

The lack of a supranational legal authority that can enforce private contracts across borders makes debt repayment in an international setting contingent on borrowers' willingness to pay rather than ability to pay. This market failure (i.e., inadequate enforcement) causes investment to fall short of its unconstrained level. This paper examines how foreign aid affects a country's willingness to honor private investment agreements. We consider two types of aid: technical assistance and loan subsidies. We show that when enforcement is inadequate, aid has the following effects: (i) it reduces default risk, promotes capital flows, and can, in principle, restore investment to its unconstrained level; (ii) when default risk is high, aid can increase the welfare of both the recipient and the donor country. Thus, foreign aid serves as an enforcement mechanism in an international setting. This provides a nonaltruistic rationale for foreign aid. Finally, we discuss the implications of providing bilateral versus multilateral aid (e.g., by individual countries versus multilateral organizations).

Suggested Citation

  • Asiedu, Elizabeth & Villamil, Anne P., 2002. "Imperfect Enforcement, Foreign Investment, And Foreign Aid," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 6(4), pages 476-495, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:macdyn:v:6:y:2002:i:04:p:476-495_01
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    Cited by:

    1. Elizabeth Asiedu & Yi Jin & Anne Villamil, 2006. "Do lack of transparency and enforcement undermine international risk-sharing?," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 123-140, March.
    2. Kyriakos C. Neanidis & Dimitrios Varvarigos, 2005. "The Impact of Foreign Aid on Economic Growth: Volatility of Disbursements and Distribution of Receipts," Economics Discussion Paper Series 0533, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    3. Asiedu, Elizabeth & Jin, Yi & Nandwa, Boaz, 2009. "Does foreign aid mitigate the adverse effect of expropriation risk on foreign direct investment?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(2), pages 268-275, July.
    4. Yi Jin & Zhixiong Zeng, 2017. "Expropriation and foreign direct investment in a positive economic theory of foreign aid," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 64(1), pages 139-160, June.
    5. Jana Brandt & Markus Jorra, 2012. "Aid Withdrawal as Punishment for Defaulting Sovereigns? An Empirical Analysis," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201220, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    6. Philip R. Lane, 2015. "International Financial Flows in Low-Income Countries," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(1), pages 49-72, February.
    7. Hassan Naqvi, 2014. "IMF Conditionality and the Intertemporal Allocation of Resources," International Review of Finance, International Review of Finance Ltd., vol. 14(2), pages 203-235, June.
    8. Wezel, Torsten, 2004. "Does co-financing by multilateral development banks increase "risky" direct investment in emerging markets?," Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 2004,02, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    9. Asiedu, Elizabeth, 2003. "Debt relief and institutional reform: a focus on Heavily Indebted Poor Countries," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 43(4), pages 614-626.
    10. Uras, Burak R., 2016. "Long-Term Investment And Net-Worth Building With Limited Contract Enforcement," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 20(1), pages 276-312, January.
    11. Stéphane Pallage & Michel A. Robe & Catherine Bérubé, 2006. "The Potential of Foreign Aid as Insurance," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 53(3), pages 1-5.
    12. Uras, Burak R., 2016. "Long-Term Investment And Net-Worth Building With Limited Contract Enforcement," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 20(1), pages 276-312, January.
    13. Carro, Martha & Larrú, José María, 2010. "Flowing Together or Flowing Apart: An Analysis of the Relation between FDI and ODA Flows to Argentina and Brazil," MPRA Paper 25064, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. K C Neanidis & D Varvarigos, 2005. "The Impact of Foreign Aid on Economic Growth: Volatility of Disbursements and Distribution of Receipts," Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research Discussion Paper Series 56, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    15. Kyriakos C. Neanidis & Dimitrios Varvarigos, 2007. "The Allocation of volatile aid and economic growth: Evidence and a suggestive theory," Discussion Paper Series 2007_07, Department of Economics, Loughborough University, revised Mar 2007.

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