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Managerial Risk-Taking Incentives and Merger Decisions

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  • Lin, Chen
  • Officer, Micah S.
  • Shen, Beibei

Abstract

We provide evidence concerning the effect of managerial risk-taking incentives on merger and acquisition (M&A) decisions and outcomes for different types of mergers: vertical, horizontal, and diversifying. Using chief executive officer (CEO) relative inside leverage to proxy for the incentives of risk-averse managers, we find that CEOs with higher inside leverage are more likely to engage in vertical mergers, and those mergers generate lower announcement returns for shareholders. This effect of CEO relative inside leverage on returns for shareholders in vertical acquisitions is more pronounced when the acquirer has a higher degree of informational opacity, weak governance, and excess cash.

Suggested Citation

  • Lin, Chen & Officer, Micah S. & Shen, Beibei, 2018. "Managerial Risk-Taking Incentives and Merger Decisions," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 53(2), pages 643-680, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:jfinqa:v:53:y:2018:i:02:p:643-680_00
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Nie, George Y., 2024. "The Missing Dimension of Risk: Evidence from Inside Debt Maturity and Acquisition Choices," SocArXiv jd3c2, Center for Open Science.
    2. Kryzanowski, Lawrence & Nie, Yulin (George), 2019. "M&A price pressure revisited," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 299-308.
    3. Salama, Feras M. & Samet, Anis, 2022. "The impact of CEO inside debt on the coinsurance effect and excess value of diversification," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 58-74.
    4. Cheng-Few Lee & Chengru Hu & Maggie Foley, 2021. "Differential risk effect of inside debt, CEO compensation diversification, and firm investment," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 56(2), pages 505-543, February.
    5. Jana P. Fidrmuc & Tereza Tykvova, 2023. "Are Acquirer Shareholders Happier when Their Industries Are Unhappy?," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series 23-52, Swiss Finance Institute.
    6. Boubakri, Narjess & Cosset, Jean-Claude & Mishra, Dev & Somé, Hyacinthe Y., 2023. "The value of risk-taking in mergers: Role of ownership and country legal institutions," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 427-444.
    7. Greiner, Michael & Kim, Jaemin & Cordon Thor, Jennifer, 2023. "CEO values as antecedents to corporate political activity: An empirical exploration," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 160(C).
    8. Zhang, Zhuang & Chizema, Amon & Kuo, Jing-Ming & Zhang, Qingjing, 2022. "Managerial risk-reducing incentives and social and exchange capital," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(6).
    9. Kun Li & Chaohua He & Wassim Dbouk & Ke Zhao, 2021. "The Value of CSR in Acquisitions: Evidence from China," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(7), pages 1-21, March.
    10. Meng, Qingbin & Zhong, Ziya & Li, Xinyu & Wang, Song, 2023. "What protects me also makes me behave: The role of directors' and officers' liability insurance on empire-building managers in China," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).
    11. Yu, Zhen & Li, Yuankun & Ouyang, Ziyi, 2021. "Economic policy uncertainty, hold-up risk and vertical integration: Evidence from China," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).

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