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The Politics of Related Lending

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  • Halling, Michael
  • Pichler, Pegaret
  • Stomper, Alex

Abstract

We analyze the profitability of government-owned banks’ lending to their owners, using a unique data set of relatively homogeneous government-owned banks; the banks are all owned by similarly structured local governments in a single country. Making use of a natural experiment that altered the regulatory and competitive environment, we find evidence that such lending was used to transfer revenues from the banks to the governments. Some of the evidence is particularly pronounced in localities where the incumbent politicians face significant competition for reelection.

Suggested Citation

  • Halling, Michael & Pichler, Pegaret & Stomper, Alex, 2016. "The Politics of Related Lending," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 51(1), pages 333-358, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:jfinqa:v:51:y:2016:i:01:p:333-358_00
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    Cited by:

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    2. Vollmer Uwe, 2015. "‚Stairway to Heaven‘ oder ‚Highway to Hell‘? – Eine Einschätzung der Europäischen Bankenunion / ‚Stairway to Heaven‘ or ‚Highway to Hell‘? – An Evaluation of the European Banking Union," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 66(1), pages 147-174, January.
    3. Rao, Pingui & Yue, Heng & Zhu, Jigao, 2015. "An investigation of credit borrower concentration," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 208-221.
    4. Koetter, Michael & Müller, Carola & Noth, Felix & Fritz, Benedikt, 2018. "May the force be with you: Exit barriers, governance shocks, and profitability sclerosis in banking," Discussion Papers 49/2018, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    5. Haselmann, Rainer & Kick, Thomas & Behn, Markus & Vig, Vikrant, 2015. "The Political Economy of Bank Bailouts," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113082, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    6. de Andres, Pablo & Garcia-Rodriguez, Inigo & Romero-Merino, M. Elena & Santamaria-Mariscal, Marcos, 2022. "Stakeholder governance and private benefits: The case of politicians in Spanish cajas," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 1272-1292.
    7. Chen, Yi-Ling & Ting, Hsiu-I & Wang, Ming-Chun, 2021. "Government support and bank performance during the 2007–2008 financial crisis," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 55(C).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • L32 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Public Enterprises; Public-Private Enterprises

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