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Interpreting Common Stock Returns around Proxy Statement Disclosures and Annual Shareholder Meetings

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  • Brickley, James A.

Abstract

Numerous studies have analyzed the stock market reaction to information released in proxy statements. Two possible biases in proxy statement research are suggested frequently: misspecification of the return benchmark and a sample selection bias from analyzing only “clean” events. This paper presents evidence that most of the conclusions of existing studies are not affected by these potential biases. A significantly positive abnormal return was found around a random sample of shareholder meeting dates. The result indicates that interpreting event study results for announcements occurring around annual shareholder meetings must be conducted carefully. The results are consistent with the findings of Kalay and Loewenstein [14], who argue that risk and expected return can increase around predictable, information-producing events. Alternatively, the study can be viewed as being consistent with several recent studies that find anomalous results, using daily return data and large samples.

Suggested Citation

  • Brickley, James A., 1986. "Interpreting Common Stock Returns around Proxy Statement Disclosures and Annual Shareholder Meetings," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 21(3), pages 343-349, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:jfinqa:v:21:y:1986:i:03:p:343-349_01
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    Cited by:

    1. Randall Morck & Bernard Yeung, 2010. "Agency Problems and the Fate of Capitalism," NBER Working Papers 16490, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Chii-Shyan Kuo & Chandra Subramaniam & Xu Wang & Shih-Ti Yu, 2020. "Adoption of performance-vested equity incentives under investor pressure: window dressing or taking the window of opportunity?," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 54(2), pages 565-587, February.
    3. Connelly, J. Thomas & Limpaphayom, Piman & Nagarajan, Nandu J., 2012. "Form versus substance: The effect of ownership structure and corporate governance on firm value in Thailand," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(6), pages 1722-1743.
    4. Bekjarovski, Filip, 2019. "Active investing," Other publications TiSEM 7636da9d-f63e-451a-ba78-d, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    5. Renneboog, L.D.R. & Szilagyi, P.G., 2009. "Shareholder Activism through the Proxy Process," Other publications TiSEM cc25d736-2965-4511-b100-1, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    6. Gillan, Stuart L. & Starks, Laura T., 2000. "Corporate governance proposals and shareholder activism: the role of institutional investors," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 275-305, August.
    7. Morgan, Angela G. & Poulsen, Annette B., 2001. "Linking pay to performance--compensation proposals in the S&P 500," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(3), pages 489-523, December.
    8. Matthew T. Billett & David C. Mauer & Yilei Zhang, 2010. "Stockholder and Bondholder Wealth Effects of CEO Incentive Grants," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 39(2), pages 463-487, June.
    9. Keith K.W. Chan & Damien W. McColough & Michael T. Skully, 1993. "Australian Tax Changes and Dividend Reinvestment Announcement Effects: A Pre- and Post-Imputation Study," Australian Journal of Management, Australian School of Business, vol. 18(1), pages 41-62, June.
    10. Valentin Dimitrov & Prem C. Jain, 2011. "It's Showtime: Do Managers Report Better News Before Annual Shareholder Meetings?," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(5), pages 1193-1221, December.
    11. Venkateswar, Sankaran, 1992. "Replacement cost disclosures, information asymmetry and market-maker behaviour: Assessment through the bid-ask spread," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 139-155.
    12. James M. Mahoney & Joseph T. Mahoney & Chamu Sundaramurthy, 1995. "The differential impact on stockholder wealth of various antitakeover provisions," Research Paper 9512, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    13. Core, John E. & Larcker, David F., 2002. "Performance consequences of mandatory increases in executive stock ownership," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 317-340, June.
    14. Szilagyi, P.G., 2007. "Corporate governance and the agency costs of debt and outside equity," Other publications TiSEM 9520d40a-224f-43a8-9bf9-b, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    15. Yermack, David, 2006. "Flights of fancy: Corporate jets, CEO perquisites, and inferior shareholder returns," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 211-242, April.

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