Large Bank Failures and Investor Risk Perceptions: Evidence from the Debt Market
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- Stephen M. Avila & Kevin L. Eastman & Richard B. Corbett & John C. Bratton1, 2000. "Stock Market Reactions and Information Transfer Due to Financial Instability in the Life Insurance Industry," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 3(2), pages 155-170, September.
- Robert E. Lamy & G. Rodney Thompson, 1986. "Penn Square, Problem Loans, And Insolvency Risk," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 9(2), pages 103-111, June.
- Maximilian J.B. Hall, 2001.
"The basle Committee's proposals for a new capital adequacy assessment framework: a critique,"
BNL Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 54(217), pages 111-179.
- Maximilian J.B. Hall, 2001. "The basle Committee's proposals for a new capital adequacy assessment framework: a critique," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 54(217), pages 111-179.
- Chen, Andrew H. & Robinson, Kenneth J. & Siems, Thomas F., 2004.
"The wealth effects from a subordinated debt policy: evidence from passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,"
Review of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(1-2), pages 103-119.
- Andrew H Chen & Kenneth J Robinson & Thomas F Siems, 2004. "The wealth effects from a subordinated debt policy: evidence from passage of the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act," Review of Financial Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 13(1-2), pages 103-119.
- Douglas D. Evanoff & Larry D. Wall, 2000.
"Subordinated debt and bank capital reform,"
FRB Atlanta Working Paper
2000-24, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
- Douglas D. Evanoff & Larry D. Wall, 2000. "Subordinated debt and bank capital reform," Working Paper Series WP-00-7, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
- anonymous, 1999. "Using subordinated debt as an instrument of market discipline," Staff Studies 172, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
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