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The Prudent Village: Risk Pooling Institutions in Medieval English Agriculture

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  • RICHARDSON, GARY

Abstract

The prudent peasant mitigated the risk of crop failures by scattering his arable land throughout his village, Deirdre McCloskey argued, because alternative risk-sharing institutions did not exist. But, alternatives did exist, this essay concludes. Medieval English peasants formed two types of farmers' cooperatives. Fraternities protected members from the perils of everyday life. Customary poor laws redistributed resources towards villagers beset by bad luck. In both institutions, the expectation of reciprocation motivated farmers with surpluses to aid neighbors with shortages.

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  • Richardson, Gary, 2005. "The Prudent Village: Risk Pooling Institutions in Medieval English Agriculture," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 65(2), pages 386-413, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:jechis:v:65:y:2005:i:02:p:386-413_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Matthew T. Gregg, 2009. "Cultural Persistence as Behavior Towards Risk: Evidence from the North Carolina Cherokees, 1850-1880," Journal of Income Distribution, Ad libros publications inc., vol. 18(2), pages 3-15, June.
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    4. Christopher Gerrard & David Petley, 2013. "A risk society? Environmental hazards, risk and resilience in the later Middle Ages in Europe," Natural Hazards: Journal of the International Society for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Hazards, Springer;International Society for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Hazards, vol. 69(1), pages 1051-1079, October.
    5. Dan Bogart & Gary Richardson, 2011. "Property Rights and Parliament in Industrializing Britain," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(2), pages 241-274.
    6. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/eu4vqp9ompqllr09iatsh0to2 is not listed on IDEAS
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    8. Phillipp R. Schofield, 2008. "The social economy of the medieval village in the early fourteenth century1," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 61(s1), pages 38-63, August.
    9. Stefan Mann & Henry Wüstemann, 2010. "Efficiency and utility: an evolutionary perspective," International Journal of Social Economics, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 37(9), pages 676-685, August.
    10. Ruben Durante, 2010. "Risk, Cooperation and the Economic origins of social Trust: an empirical Investigation," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-00972949, HAL.
    11. Steven G. Medema, 2020. "The Coase Theorem at Sixty," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 58(4), pages 1045-1128, December.
    12. Greif, Avner & Iyigun, Murat & Sasson, Diego, 2011. "Risk, Institutions and Growth: Why England and Not China?," IZA Discussion Papers 5598, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    13. Greif, Avner & Iyigun, Murat, 2013. "What Did the Old Poor Law Really Accomplish? A Redux," IZA Discussion Papers 7398, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    14. Ho, Hoang-Anh, 2023. "Land rights in historical Vietnam: Theory and evidence," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    15. Gong, Yazhen & Bull, Gary & Baylis, Kathy, 2010. "Participation in the world's first clean development mechanism forest project: The role of property rights, social capital and contractual rules," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(6), pages 1292-1302, April.
    16. Srinivas, Smita, 2010. "Industrial welfare and the state: nation and city reconsidered," MPRA Paper 52651, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. Sheilagh Ogilvie, 2007. "'Whatever Is, Is Right'?, Economic Institutions in Pre-Industrial Europe (Tawney Lecture 2006)," CESifo Working Paper Series 2066, CESifo.
    18. Ferrara, Andreas & Testa, Patrick A., 2020. "Resource Blessing? Oil, Risk, and Religious Communities as Social Insurance in the U.S. South," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 513, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    19. Richardson, Gary & McBride, Michael, 2009. "Religion, longevity, and cooperation: The case of the craft guild," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 172-186, August.
    20. Philipp Ager & Casper Worm Hansen & Ezra Karger & Lars Lønstrup, 2024. "Religion as Social Insurance: Evidence From the Great Mississippi Flood of 1927," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2024_603, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    21. Ruben Durante, 2010. "Risk, Cooperation and the Economic origins of social Trust: an empirical Investigation," SciencePo Working papers hal-00972949, HAL.
    22. Neil Rollings, 2007. "British business history: A review of the periodical literature for 2005," Business History, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 49(3), pages 271-292.
    23. Durante, Ruben, 2009. "Risk, Cooperation and the Economic Origins of Social Trust: an Empirical Investigation," MPRA Paper 25887, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    24. Timur Kuran & Jared Rubin, 2014. "The Financial Power of the Powerless: Socio-Economic Status and Interest Rates under Partial Rule of Law," Working Papers 14-22, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    25. Ogilvie, Sheilagh & Carus, A.W., 2014. "Institutions and Economic Growth in Historical Perspective," Handbook of Economic Growth, in: Philippe Aghion & Steven Durlauf (ed.), Handbook of Economic Growth, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 8, pages 403-513, Elsevier.

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