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Collective Goods and International Organization

Author

Listed:
  • Russett, Bruce M.
  • Sullivan, John D.

Abstract

As they pursue their goals, actors—whether individuals, groups, or states—attempt to consume goods and services of various types. Generally they try to obtain such goods through private action. Thus, individuals clothe and entertain themselves by means of their individual actions in various marketplaces. Similarly, states will attempt to achieve goals and put policies into effect through their own actions. They will trade with other countries, develop defensive capabilities, and produce scientific knowledge substantially through their own efforts. States behave, then, as if they were private consumers in a market economy.

Suggested Citation

  • Russett, Bruce M. & Sullivan, John D., 1971. "Collective Goods and International Organization," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 25(4), pages 845-865, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:intorg:v:25:y:1971:i:04:p:845-865_01
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    Cited by:

    1. Bruno S. Frey & Paolo Pamini, 2009. "World Heritage: Where Are We? An Empirical Analysis," CREMA Working Paper Series 2009-31, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
    2. Matthew Moore, 2010. "Arming the Embargoed: A Supply-Side Understanding of Arms Embargo Violations," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 54(4), pages 593-615, August.
    3. Tobias Böhmelt & Carola Betzold, 2013. "The impact of environmental interest groups in international negotiations: Do ENGOs induce stronger environmental commitments?," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 127-151, May.
    4. Dana G. Dalrymple, 2008. "International agricultural research as a global public good: concepts, the CGIAR experience and policy issues," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 20(3), pages 347-379.
    5. Rahel M. Schomaker, 2017. "Public-Private Governance Regimes in the Global Sphere," Public Organization Review, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 121-138, March.
    6. Earl R. Brubaker, 1976. "Some Effects of Private Contributions to International Security Programs," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 2(1), pages 15-29, February.
    7. Klomp, Jeroen, 2024. "Targeting profits: The economic impact of arms embargoes on defense companies," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 391-416.
    8. Sandler, Todd & Tschirhart, John T, 1980. "The Economic Theory of Clubs: An Evaluative Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 18(4), pages 1481-1521, December.
    9. Steven D. Roper & Lilian A. Barria, 2010. "Burden Sharing in the Funding of the UNHCR: Refugee Protection as an Impure Public Good," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 54(4), pages 616-637, August.
    10. Wallace J. Thies, 1987. "Alliances and Collective Goods," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 31(2), pages 298-332, June.
    11. Joel Carbonell & Juliann Allison, 2015. "Democracy and state environmental commitment to international environmental treaties," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 79-104, May.
    12. Michael D. Intriligator, 1982. "Research on Conflict Theory," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 26(2), pages 307-327, June.
    13. Yayan Xie & Yang Su & Feng Li, 2022. "The Evolutionary Game Analysis of Low Carbon Production Behaviour of Farmers, Government and Consumers in Food Safety Source Governance," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 19(19), pages 1-16, September.
    14. Nozomu Matsubara, 1989. "Conflict and Limits of Power," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 33(1), pages 113-141, March.
    15. John R. Oneal, 1990. "Testing the Theory of Collective Action," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 34(3), pages 426-448, September.
    16. Todd Sandler, 1993. "The Economic Theory of Alliances," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 37(3), pages 446-483, September.
    17. Jyoti Khanna & Todd Sandler & Hirofumi Shimizu, 1998. "Sharing the Financial Burden for U.N. and NATO Peacekeeping, 1976-1996," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 42(2), pages 176-195, April.

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