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Down a Slippery Slope: Lack of Trust, Coercive Threats and Business Tax Resistance in Greece, 1955–1988

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  • Battilossi, Stefano
  • Pittaki, Zoi

Abstract

Over the second half of the 20th century, Greek governments failed to tax business income in line with the country’s level of economic development. This paper uses the “slippery slope” model of tax compliance to explain why the reform of income and corporate taxation in the late 1950s met strong resistance in the business sector. We argue that the negative legacy of interwar reforms, the lack of sustained and credible investment in trust building in coincidence with the postwar reforms, and the intensification of coercive threats in tax enforcement led to an antagonistic tax climate and a degradation of enforced and voluntary compliance. Our qualitative analysis based on original primary sources shows that the arguments publicly voiced by entrepreneurs and their organizations reflected their persistent perception of tax power as unfair, arbitrary and extractive. Using aggregate tax returns data, our quantitative analysis finds evidence of systematic and increasing income underreporting both by unincorporated and incorporated businesses. This vicious circle of non-cooperation and mutual distrust explains why governments got trapped into a persistent low tax capacity equilibrium that still casts a shadow on the Greek economy.

Suggested Citation

  • Battilossi, Stefano & Pittaki, Zoi, 2025. "Down a Slippery Slope: Lack of Trust, Coercive Threats and Business Tax Resistance in Greece, 1955–1988," Enterprise & Society, Cambridge University Press, vol. 26(1), pages 57-93, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:entsoc:v:26:y:2025:i:1:p:57-93_3
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