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A Developmental Model of Heterogeneous Economic Voting in New Democracies

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  • Duch, Raymond M.

Abstract

I argue that information and trust in nascent democratic institutions are two important sources of heterogeneity in economic voting in transition democracies. Economic voting develops in postcommunist electorates as ambiguity regarding the link between government policy and economic outcomes declines. The link becomes less ambiguous as citizens become more informed about how democratic institutions function and gain increasing confidence or trust in the responsiveness of these institutions to public preferences. In the early period of democratization the conditions necessary for an effective agency relationship between voter and incumbent are not yet fully developed. Economic voting increases as these levels of information on, and trust in, government rise. The analysis that tests these propositions is based on a public opinion survey conducted in Hungary in 1997. The test is replicated with a 1997 Polish election survey.

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  • Duch, Raymond M., 2001. "A Developmental Model of Heterogeneous Economic Voting in New Democracies," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 95(4), pages 895-910, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:95:y:2001:i:04:p:895-910_40
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    Cited by:

    1. Cameron Shelton, 2014. "Legislative budget cycles," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 159(1), pages 251-275, April.
    2. O. Yap, 2011. "Informal accountability, credible actions, and democratization in Taiwan," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 103-121, June.
    3. Matthew J. Lebo & Janet M. Box‐Steffensmeier, 2008. "Dynamic Conditional Correlations in Political Science," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 52(3), pages 688-704, July.
    4. Dutta, Nabamita & Williamson, Claudia R., 2016. "Aiding economic freedom: Exploring the role of political institutions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 45(S), pages 24-38.
    5. Puspa Delima Amri & Florence Bouvet, 2024. "Do voters in developing and transitional democracies care about income inequality? the role of media freedom," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(1), pages 245-274, March.
    6. Miraj ul Haq & Nuzhat Shamim & Muhammad Luqman, 2020. "Foreign Aid, Political Institutions and Economic Freedom: Empirical Evidence from Selected Developing Countries," Lahore Journal of Economics, Department of Economics, The Lahore School of Economics, vol. 25(1), pages 153-178, Jan-June.
    7. Michael Lewis-Beck & Mary Stegmaier, 2013. "The VP-function revisited: a survey of the literature on vote and popularity functions after over 40 years," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 157(3), pages 367-385, December.
    8. repec:gig:joupla:v:2:y:2010:i:1:p:53-78 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Newton, Kenneth, 2005. "Support for democracy: Social capital, civil society and political performance," Discussion Papers, Research Group Civil Society, Citizenship and Political Mobilization in Europe SP IV 2005-402, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    10. Heather Congdon Fors, 2016. "Citizens' support for Economic Reforms in Sub-Saharan Africa," South African Journal of Economics, Economic Society of South Africa, vol. 84(3), pages 343-363, September.

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