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Strategic Policy Considerations and Voting Fluidity on the Burger Court

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  • Maltzman, Forrest
  • Wahlbeck, Paul J.

Abstract

Justices are strategic actors. This is particularly evident when they change their votes between the original conference on the merits and the Court's announcement of the final decision. We predict that such voting fluidity may be influenced by strategic policy considerations, justices' uncertainty over issues involved in a case, the chief justice's interest in protecting his prerogatives, and other institutional pressures. To test our hypotheses, we explore the occurrence of fluidity on the Burger Court (1969–85). Using logistic regression, we show that justices' decisions to change their votes stem primarily from strategic policy considerations. In limited instances, the decision to switch can be attributed to either uncertainty or institutional pressures. Our findings suggest that the decision of a justice to join an opinion results from more than his or her initial policy preferences; final votes are influenced as well by the politics of opinion writing.

Suggested Citation

  • Maltzman, Forrest & Wahlbeck, Paul J., 1996. "Strategic Policy Considerations and Voting Fluidity on the Burger Court," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 90(3), pages 581-592, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:90:y:1996:i:03:p:581-592_20
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    Cited by:

    1. Iain Hampsher‐Monk & Andrew Hindmoor, 2010. "Rational Choice and Interpretive Evidence: Caught between a Rock and a Hard Place?," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 58(1), pages 47-65, February.
    2. Aspasia Tsaoussi & Eleni Zervogianni, 2010. "Judges as satisficers: a law and economics perspective on judicial liability," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 333-357, June.
    3. Clark, Tom S. & Montagnes, B. Pablo & Spenkuch, Jörg L., 2022. "Politics from the Bench? Ideology and Strategic Voting in the U.S. Supreme Court," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 214(C).
    4. Lee Epstein & Olga Shvetsova, 2002. "Heresthetical Maneuvering on the US Supreme Court," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 14(1), pages 93-122, January.
    5. Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, 2008. "Bias in Judicial Citations: A Window into the Behavior of Judges?," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 37(1), pages 87-129, January.

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