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The Destruction of Issue Monopolies in Congress

Author

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  • Jones, Bryan D.
  • Baumgartner, Frank R.
  • Talbert, Jeffery C.

Abstract

Scholars studying congressional committees have noted the potential for members to seek membership on particular committees, leading to bias. Underpinning this line of scholarship is what might be termed a theory of comparative committee statics, characterized by a cross-sectional empirical approach. We present a new approach that focuses on the dynamics of jurisdictional control. By following a series of issues through the committee hearing process, we show that there is indeed significant issue bias in particular committee venues. However, we also find that new committees often claim jurisdiction over issues as they are redefined in the political process. The degree of jurisdictional monopoly enjoyed by different committees has been overlooked in the literature on this topic in spite of its importance in determining the nature of representation of interests in Congress.

Suggested Citation

  • Jones, Bryan D. & Baumgartner, Frank R. & Talbert, Jeffery C., 1993. "The Destruction of Issue Monopolies in Congress," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(3), pages 657-671, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:87:y:1993:i:03:p:657-671_10
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    Cited by:

    1. John de Figueiredo, 2013. "Committee jurisdiction, congressional behavior and policy outcomes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 154(1), pages 119-137, January.
    2. Frank M Häge, 2020. "Allocating political attention in the EU’s foreign and security policy: The effect of supranational agenda-setters," European Union Politics, , vol. 21(4), pages 634-656, December.
    3. Guillermo M. Cejudo & Philipp Trein, 2023. "Pathways to policy integration: a subsystem approach," Policy Sciences, Springer;Society of Policy Sciences, vol. 56(1), pages 9-27, March.
    4. Deserai A. Crow, 2010. "Policy Punctuations in Colorado Water Law: The Breakdown of a Monopoly," Review of Policy Research, Policy Studies Organization, vol. 27(2), pages 147-166, March.
    5. Michiel Vries, 2005. "Institutional Fleecing: The Slow Death of Dutch Provinces," Public Organization Review, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 295-315, November.
    6. Sitko, Nicholas j. & Babu, Suresh & Hoffman, Barak, 2017. "Practitioner’S Guidebook And Toolkit For Agricultural Policy Reform: The P.M.C.A. Approach To Strategic Policy Engagement," Feed the Future Innovation Lab for Food Security Policy Research Papers 259556, Michigan State University, Department of Agricultural, Food, and Resource Economics, Feed the Future Innovation Lab for Food Security (FSP).
    7. Xuejun Jin & Xiao Pan, 2023. "Government Attention, Market Competition and Firm Digital Transformation," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(11), pages 1-27, June.
    8. Michael Gruszczynski & Sarah Michaels, 2012. "The evolution of elite framing following enactment of legislation," Policy Sciences, Springer;Society of Policy Sciences, vol. 45(4), pages 359-384, December.
    9. John M. de Figueiredo, 2011. "Committee Jurisdiction, Congressional Behavior and Policy Outcomes," NBER Working Papers 17171, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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