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Revolutionary Collective Action and the Agent-Structure Problem

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  • Berejikian, Jeffrey

Abstract

Unraveling the nexus between agents and structures is fundamental to an understanding of political and social change. The two most prominent methodological approaches to explain revolutionary collective action involve either individual reductionism or structural reductionism. Both approaches result in theoretical inconsistencies and/or explanatory anomalies. An alternative proposed here utilizes the concept of framing developed in behavioral decision theory primarily by Quatrone and Tversky. It directly addresses the agent-structure problem by developing the proposition that individuals evoke alternative decision rules in different structural contexts. The result is greater theoretical coherence and resolution of anomalous cases. Additionally, this model begins to define a new role for ideology in explanations of revolutionary collective action.

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  • Berejikian, Jeffrey, 1992. "Revolutionary Collective Action and the Agent-Structure Problem," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 86(3), pages 647-657, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:86:y:1992:i:03:p:647-657_09
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    Cited by:

    1. M.A.L.M. van Assen & C.C.P. Snijders, 2010. "The effect of nonlinear utility on behaviour in repeated prisoner’s dilemmas," Rationality and Society, , vol. 22(3), pages 301-332, August.
    2. Ispano, Alessandro & Schwardmann, Peter, 2017. "Cooperating over losses and competing over gains: A social dilemma experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 329-348.
    3. Carlson Lisa J & Dacey Raymond, 2006. "Confusions of Loss Aversion and Risk Attitude in International Relations and Peace Science," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 12(2), pages 92-106, September.
    4. Lisa J. Carlson & Raymond Dacey, 2006. "Sequential Analysis of Deterrence Games with a Declining Status Quo," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 23(2), pages 181-198, April.
    5. Roger Berger & Heiko Rauhut & Sandra Prade & Dirk Helbing, "undated". "Bargaining over time in ultimatum game experiments," Working Papers CCSS-10-002, ETH Zurich, Chair of Systems Design.
    6. Haslam, Paul Alexander & Ary Tanimoune, Nasser, 2016. "The Determinants of Social Conflict in the Latin American Mining Sector: New Evidence with Quantitative Data," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 401-419.
    7. William A. Boettcher III, 2004. "Military Intervention Decisions Regarding Humanitarian Crises," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 48(3), pages 331-355, June.
    8. Haslam, Paul Alexander, 2021. "The micro-politics of corporate responsibility: How companies shape protest in communities affected by mining," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 139(C).
    9. Pierre Courtois & Rabia Nessah & Tarik Tazdaït, 2024. "Revolutions and rational choice: A critical discussion," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 200(3), pages 497-529, September.
    10. Chris Snijders & Werner Raub, 1998. "Revolution And Risk," Rationality and Society, , vol. 10(4), pages 405-425, November.
    11. Jack A. Goldstone, 1994. "Is Revolution Individually Rational?," Rationality and Society, , vol. 6(1), pages 139-166, January.

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