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Influences on Executive and Congressional Budgetary Priorities, 1955–1981

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  • Kamlet, Mark S.
  • Mowery, David C.

Abstract

A reduced form equation system is used to analyze the influence of economic, political, and institutional influences on the budgetary priorities of the executive branch and Congress during fiscal 1955–81. Three related issues are considered: the extent to which political and macroeconomic factors affect priorities; the degree of interdependence among the components of the federal budget and between spending and revenues; and differences between the executive branch and Congress with respect to these issues. Both types of interdependence are present within both executive branch and congressional budgeting, although this interdependence is stronger within the executive branch. The influence of economic conditions on budgetary outcomes is strong but varies considerably across spending categories. There is no evidence of apolitical business cycle. Political variables exert a modest influence on the budgetary outcomes examined; differences between Democratic and Republican budgetary policies, as well as differences in the budgetary priorities of different presidential administrations, are small by comparison with the differences between executive and congressional policies.

Suggested Citation

  • Kamlet, Mark S. & Mowery, David C., 1987. "Influences on Executive and Congressional Budgetary Priorities, 1955–1981," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 81(1), pages 155-178, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:81:y:1987:i:01:p:155-178_19
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    Cited by:

    1. Eric Dubois, 2016. "Political business cycles 40 years after Nordhaus," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 166(1), pages 235-259, January.
    2. Uk Heo & John Bohte, 2012. "Who Pays for National Defense? Financing Defense Programs in the United States, 1947–2007," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 56(3), pages 413-438, June.
    3. Klomp, Jeroen, 2023. "Political budget cycles in military expenditures: A meta-analysis," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 1083-1102.
    4. Klomp, Jeroen, 2023. "Defending election victory by attacking company revenues: The impact of elections on the international defense industry," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).

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