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A Spatial Model of International Conflict

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  • Morrow, James D.

Abstract

The model presented here assumes that nations initiate conflict to change the international status quo across one or more issues to an outcome they prefer. Their preferences for different issue outcomes are represented by a classical spatial utility function. International coalitions are formed both to enhance the chance of a successful challenge and to counter existing challenges. Disputes are modeled as periods of competition between two coalitions through the recruitment of additional members, erosion of support for the opposing coalition and escalation of the crisis. The two-nation model is analyzed in detail, and the existence of the core for the resulting game is proved. The two main conclusions of the two-nation model are that nations have a general incentive to exaggerate their issue positions in disputes and that the possibility of issue trades enhances the likelihood of compromise.

Suggested Citation

  • Morrow, James D., 1986. "A Spatial Model of International Conflict," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 80(4), pages 1131-1150, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:80:y:1986:i:04:p:1131-1150_18
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Hoffmann, Magnus, 2007. "The Social Benefit of War," MPRA Paper 6196, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. D. Scott Bennett, 1997. "Measuring Rivalry Termination, 1816-1992," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 41(2), pages 227-254, April.
    3. Kurt Taylor Gaubatz, 1991. "Election Cycles and War," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 35(2), pages 212-244, June.
    4. T. Clifton Morgan & Sally Howard Campbell, 1991. "Domestic Structure, Decisional Constraints, and War," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 35(2), pages 187-211, June.
    5. HEIFETZ, Aviad & SEGEV, Ella, 2003. "Escalation and delay in protracted international conflicts," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2003048, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    6. Mark Abdollahian & Carole Alsharabati, 2003. "Modeling the Strategic Effects of Risk and Perceptions in Linkage Politics," Rationality and Society, , vol. 15(1), pages 113-135, February.
    7. Mark Irving Lichbach, 1990. "When Is an Arms Rivalry a Prisoner's Dilemma?," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 34(1), pages 29-56, March.
    8. James D. Morrow & Kevin L. Cope, 2021. "The limits of information revelation in multilateral negotiations: A theory of treatymaking," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 33(4), pages 399-429, October.
    9. Heifetz, Aviad & Segev, Ella, 2005. "Escalation and delay in protracted international conflicts," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 17-37, January.
    10. James D. Morrow, 1994. "Alliances, Credibility, and Peacetime Costs," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 38(2), pages 270-297, June.
    11. Gary Goertz, 2004. "Constraints, Compromises, and Decision Making," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 48(1), pages 14-37, February.

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