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Provision of Public Goods and the MCS Experimental Paradigm

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  • Rapoport, Amnon

Abstract

Van de Kragt, Orbell, and Dawes (1983) reported the results of a series of experiments in which n subjects each receive a monetary endowment and then may choose privately whether to contribute it to a monetary public good; the good is supplied if a prespecified number m

Suggested Citation

  • Rapoport, Amnon, 1985. "Provision of Public Goods and the MCS Experimental Paradigm," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 79(1), pages 148-155, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:79:y:1985:i:01:p:148-155_22
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    Cited by:

    1. Mark I. Lichbach, 1994. "Rethinking Rationality and Rebellion," Rationality and Society, , vol. 6(1), pages 8-39, January.
    2. Aidas Masiliunas, 2016. "Inefficient Lock-in with Sophisticated and Myopic Players," AMSE Working Papers 1615, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France, revised 19 Apr 2016.
    3. Masiliūnas, Aidas, 2019. "Overcoming inefficient lock-in in coordination games with sophisticated and myopic players," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 1-12.
    4. Michael J. G. Cain & Keith L. Dougherty, 1999. "Suppressing Shays' Rebellion," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 11(2), pages 233-260, April.
    5. Craig D. Parks & Lorne G. Hulbert, 1995. "High And Low Trusters' Responses To Fear in a Payoff Matrix," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 39(4), pages 718-730, December.
    6. Ido Erev & Amnon Rapoport, 1990. "Provision of Step-Level Public Goods," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 34(3), pages 401-425, September.
    7. Ramzi Suleiman, 2022. "Economic Harmony—A Rational Theory of Fairness and Cooperation in Strategic Interactions," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(3), pages 1-21, April.
    8. Ramzi Suleiman, 1997. "Provision Of Step-Level Public Goods Under Uncertainty," Rationality and Society, , vol. 9(2), pages 163-187, May.
    9. Federica Alberti & Anna Cartwright & Edward Cartwright, 2021. "Predicting Efficiency in Threshold Public Good Games: A Learning Direction Theory Approach," Working Papers in Economics & Finance 2021-01, University of Portsmouth, Portsmouth Business School, Economics and Finance Subject Group.
    10. Hugh Ward, 1990. "Three Men in a Boat, Two Must Row," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 34(3), pages 371-400, September.
    11. Maria Abou Chakra & Arne Traulsen, 2012. "Evolutionary Dynamics of Strategic Behavior in a Collective-Risk Dilemma," PLOS Computational Biology, Public Library of Science, vol. 8(8), pages 1-7, August.
    12. Masiliūnas, Aidas, 2017. "Overcoming coordination failure in a critical mass game: Strategic motives and action disclosure," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 214-251.
    13. Federica Alberti & Edward J. Cartwright & Anna Stepanova, 2012. "Threshold public good games and impulse balance theory," Jena Economics Research Papers 2011-062, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    14. David McEvoy & Todd Cherry & John Stranlund, 2015. "Endogenous Minimum Participation in International Environmental Agreements: An Experimental Analysis," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 62(4), pages 729-744, December.
    15. Alphons Kragt & Robyn Dawes & John Orbell, 1988. "Are people who cooperate ‘rational altruists’?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 56(3), pages 233-247, March.
    16. Edward Cartwright & Anna Stepanova, 2017. "Efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(4), pages 1163-1191, November.

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