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Advocacy, Interpretation, and Influence in the U.S. Congress

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  • Smith, Richard A.

Abstract

This article examines the relationship between two variables: interpretations by members of Congress of the consequences of legislative proposals and the influence of those who advocate particular actions on the proposals. The article investigates how the legislative decisions of members depend on interpretations, how the arguments of advocates shape interpretations, and how the influence on interpretations translates into influence over patterns of congressional support expressed for a legislative proposal. The major thesis is that member interpretations and hence legislative influence are unstable, a result of basic features of human decision making in the congressional context. As a result, advocates are hypothesized to have considerable influence in maintaining and expanding the size of their congressional coalitions in some legislative situations, but not others. In particular, when faced with weakening amendments or motions, advocates are unable to prevent defections among their supporters. Evidence of the legislative influence of the National Education Association during the Ninety-fourth Congress is found to be consistent with these hypotheses.

Suggested Citation

  • Smith, Richard A., 1984. "Advocacy, Interpretation, and Influence in the U.S. Congress," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 78(1), pages 44-63, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:78:y:1984:i:01:p:44-63_25
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    Cited by:

    1. Sam Bucovetsky & Amihai Glazer, 2009. "How to avoid transferring a valuable asset," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 138(1), pages 3-8, January.
    2. Dahm, Matthias & Dur, Robert & Glazerz, Amihai, 2009. "Lobbying of Firms by Voters," Working Papers 2072/43869, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    3. David Lowery & Virginia Gray, 2004. "Bias in the Heavenly Chorus," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 16(1), pages 5-29, January.
    4. Sam Bucovetsky & Amihai Glazer, 2006. "How To Avoid Awarding a Valuable Asset," Working Papers 050619, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
    5. Matthias Dahm & Robert Dur & Amihai Glazer, 2014. "How a firm can induce legislators to adopt a bad policy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 159(1), pages 63-82, April.

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