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Corrupt Politicians and Their Electoral Support: Some Experimental Observations

Author

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  • Rundquist, Barry S.
  • Strom, Gerald S.
  • Peters, John G.

Abstract

This paper concerns the relationship between voters and corrupt politicians. An explanation is suggested for why voters would discount even credible information that a candidate is corrupt. Then the results of an experiment designed to test a necessary condition in this explanation are reported. The principal implication of this exploratory study is that corrupt elected officials are immune from electoral reprisal because voters rather easily trade off the information that a candidate is corrupt in return for other things they value in the candidate.

Suggested Citation

  • Rundquist, Barry S. & Strom, Gerald S. & Peters, John G., 1977. "Corrupt Politicians and Their Electoral Support: Some Experimental Observations," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 71(3), pages 954-963, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:71:y:1977:i:03:p:954-963_26
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    Cited by:

    1. Moreno-Ternero, Juan D., 2011. "Voting over piece-wise linear tax methods," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 29-36, January.
    2. Cañete-Straub, Rumilda & Miquel-Florensa, Josepa & Straub, Stéphane & Van der Straeten, Karine, 2020. "Voting corrupt politicians out of office? Evidence from a survey experiment in Paraguay," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 223-239.
    3. repec:pdn:wpaper:70 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Eugen Dimant & Guglielmo Tosato, 2018. "Causes And Effects Of Corruption: What Has Past Decade'S Empirical Research Taught Us? A Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(2), pages 335-356, April.
    5. Mr. Marco Pani, 2009. "Hold Your Nose and Vote: Why Do Some Democracies Tolerate Corruption?," IMF Working Papers 2009/083, International Monetary Fund.
    6. Nicholas Chad Long, 2019. "The Impact of Incumbent Scandals on Senate Elections, 1972–2016," Social Sciences, MDPI, vol. 8(4), pages 1-19, April.
    7. Carson, Lindsey D. & Prado, Mariana Mota, 2016. "Using institutional multiplicity to address corruption as a collective action problem: Lessons from the Brazilian case," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 56-65.
    8. Petr Wawrosz, 2022. "How Corruption Is and Should Be Investigated by Economic Theory," Economies, MDPI, vol. 10(12), pages 1-23, December.
    9. Marco Pani, 2011. "Hold your nose and vote: corruption and public decisions in a representative democracy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(1), pages 163-196, July.
    10. Beesley, Celeste & Hawkins, Darren, 2022. "Corruption, institutional trust and political engagement in Peru," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 151(C).
    11. Neal D. Woods, 2008. "The Policy Consequences of Political Corruption: Evidence from State Environmental Programs," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 89(1), pages 258-271, March.
    12. Vuković, Vuk, 2020. "Corruption and re-election: how much can politicians steal before getting punished?," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 124-143.
    13. Evrenk, Haldun, 2011. "Why a clean politician supports dirty politics: A game-theoretical explanation for the persistence of political corruption," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 80(3), pages 498-510.
    14. Horacio A. Larreguy & John Marshall & James M. Snyder, Jr., 2014. "Revealing Malfeasance: How Local Media Facilitates Electoral Sanctioning of Mayors in Mexico," NBER Working Papers 20697, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Elena Costas-Pérez, 2014. "Political corruption and voter turnout: mobilization or disaffection?," Working Papers 2014/27, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    16. Olga Popova, 2010. "Corruption, Voting and Employment Status: Evidence from Russian Parliamentary Elections," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp428, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    17. Stefan Krause & Fabio Méndez, 2009. "Corruption And Elections: An Empirical Study For A Cross‐Section Of Countries," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(2), pages 179-200, July.

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