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Vote Trading and the Voting Paradox: A Proof of Logical Equivalence

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  • Koehler, David H.

Abstract

Riker and Brams have demonstrated the paradox of vote trading (“… that rational trades by all members [may] make everyone worse off”). In so doing the authors indicate the existence of an apparent disequilibrium when vote trading occurs. I extend this latter point and prove that the preference conditions required for vote trading are the same as those which produce the cyclical majority; the conditions for vote trading and the cyclical majority are logically equivalent. The conclusion briefly indicates the impact of this finding with respect to the work of a number of other authors and gives some idea of the restrictions which would be required to eliminate vote trading among rational legislators.

Suggested Citation

  • Koehler, David H., 1975. "Vote Trading and the Voting Paradox: A Proof of Logical Equivalence," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 69(3), pages 954-960, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:69:y:1975:i:03:p:954-960_24
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Casella, Alessandra & Turban, Sébastien, 2014. "Democracy undone. Systematic minority advantage in competitive vote markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 47-70.
    2. Thomas Schwartz, 1981. "The universal-instability theorem," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 487-501, January.
    3. Alessandra Casella & Antonin Macé, 2021. "Does Vote Trading Improve Welfare?," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 13(1), pages 57-86, August.
    4. Fatma Aslan & Hayrullah Dindar & Jean Lainé, 2022. "When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(3), pages 417-446, September.
    5. Alessandra Casella & Thomas Palfrey, 2015. "Trading Votes for Votes. A Decentralized Matching Algorithm," NBER Working Papers 21645, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Otto Keck, 1987. "The Information Dilemma," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 31(1), pages 139-163, March.
    7. Peter Bernholz, 1977. "Prisoner's dilemma, logrolling and cyclical group preferences," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 73-84, March.
    8. Casella, Alessandra & Macé, Antonin, 2020. "Does Vote Trading Improve Welfare?," CEPR Discussion Papers 15201, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Casella, Alessandra & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2021. "Trading votes for votes: A laboratory study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 125(C), pages 1-26.
    10. Dean Lacy & Emerson M.S. Niou, 2000. "A Problem with Referendums," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 12(1), pages 5-31, January.
    11. William Gehrlein & Michel Breton & Dominique Lepelley, 2017. "The likelihood of a Condorcet winner in the logrolling setting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 49(2), pages 315-327, August.

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