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Information Dissemination, Competitive Pressure, and Politician Performance between Elections: A Field Experiment in Uganda

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  • GROSSMAN, GUY
  • MICHELITCH, KRISTIN

Abstract

Politicians shirk when their performance is obscure to constituents. We theorize that when politician performance information is disseminated early in the electoral term, politicians will subsequently improve their performance in anticipation of changes in citizens’ evaluative criteria and possible challenger entry in the next election. However, politicians may only respond in constituencies where opposition has previously mounted. We test these predictions in partnership with a Ugandan civil society organization in a multiyear field experiment conducted in 20 district governments between the 2011 and 2016 elections. While the organization published yearly job duty performance scorecards for all incumbents, it disseminated the scorecards to constituents for randomly selected politicians. These dissemination efforts induced politicians to improve performance across a range of measures, but only in competitive constituencies. Service delivery was unaffected. We conclude that, conditional on electoral pressure, transparency can improve politicians’ performance between elections but not outcomes outside of their control.

Suggested Citation

  • Grossman, Guy & Michelitch, Kristin, 2018. "Information Dissemination, Competitive Pressure, and Politician Performance between Elections: A Field Experiment in Uganda," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 112(2), pages 280-301, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:112:y:2018:i:02:p:280-301_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Ben Lockwood & Francesco Porcelli & Michela Redoano & Antonio Schiavone & Benjamin Lockwood, 2022. "Does Data Disclosure Improve Local Government Performance? Evidence from Italian Municipalities," CESifo Working Paper Series 10155, CESifo.
    2. Herman, Biz & Panin, Amma & Owlsley, Nicholas & , e.a., 2021. "Field Experiments in the Global South: Assessing Risks, Localizing Benefits, and Addressing Positionality," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2021025, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    3. Perego, Viviana M.E., 2019. "Crop prices and the demand for titled land: Evidence from Uganda," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 93-109.
    4. Rubén Poblete Cazenave, 2021. "Reputation Shocks and Strategic Responses in Electoral Campaigns," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 21-049/V, Tinbergen Institute.
    5. Grossman, Guy & Humphreys, Macartan & Sacramone-Lutz, Gabriella, 2020. "Information Technology and Political Engagement: Mixed Evidence from Uganda," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 82(4), pages 1321-1336.
    6. Bowles, Jeremy & Larreguy, Horacio & Woller, Anders, 2020. "Information Versus Control: The Electoral Consequences of Polling Place Creation," TSE Working Papers 20-1154, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    7. Mogues, Tewodaj & Van Campenhout, Bjorn & Miehe, Caroline & Kabunga, Nassul, 2023. "The impact of community-based monitoring on public service delivery: A randomized control trial in Uganda," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 172(C).
    8. Hugh Waddington & Ada Sonnenfeld & Juliette Finetti & Marie Gaarder & Denny John & Jennifer Stevenson, 2019. "Citizen engagement in public services in low‐ and middle‐income countries: A mixed‐methods systematic review of participation, inclusion, transparency and accountability (PITA) initiatives," Campbell Systematic Reviews, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(1-2), June.
    9. James Habyarimana & Stuti Khemani & Thiago Scot, 2023. "The importance of political selection for bureaucratic effectiveness," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 90(359), pages 746-779, July.
    10. Garcia-Hernandez, Ana & Grossman, Guy & Michelitch, Kristin, 2022. "Gender gap in politician performance and its determinants," Ruhr Economic Papers 972, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
    11. Grácio, Matilde & Vicente, Pedro C., 2021. "Information, get-out-the-vote messages, and peer influence: Causal effects on political behavior in Mozambique," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 151(C).
    12. Hout, Wil & Wagner, Natascha & Demena, Binyam A., 2022. "Does accountability enhance service delivery? Assessment of a local scorecard initiative in Uganda," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 158(C).
    13. Callen, Michael & Gulzar, Saad & Hasanain, Ali & Khan, Muhammad Yasir & Rezaee, Arman, 2023. "The political economy of public sector absence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 218(C).
    14. Grady, Christopher & Iannantuoni, Alice & Winters, Matthew S., 2021. "Influencing the means but not the ends: The role of entertainment-education interventions in development," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 138(C).
    15. Garcia-Hernandez, Ana & Grossman, Guy & Michelitch, Kristin Grace, 2022. "Networks and the Size of the Gender Gap in Politician Performance Across Job Duties," OSF Preprints j7zg2, Center for Open Science.
    16. Lucy Martin & Pia J. Raffler, 2021. "Fault Lines: The Effects of Bureaucratic Power on Electoral Accountability," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 65(1), pages 210-224, January.
    17. Dunning, Thad & Grossman, Guy & Humphreys, Macartan & Hyde, Susan D. & McIntosh, Craig & Nellis, Gareth & Adida, Claire L. & Arias, Eric & Bicalho, Clara & Boas, Taylor C. & Buntaine, Mark T. & Chauch, 2019. "Voter information campaigns and political accountability: Cumulative findings from a preregistered meta-analysis of coordinated trials," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 5(7), pages 1-10.
    18. Abhijit Banerjee & Nils Enevoldsen & Rohini Pande & Michael Walton, 2024. "Public Information Is an Incentive for Politicians: Experimental Evidence from Delhi Elections," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 16(3), pages 323-353, July.
    19. Heggedal, Tom-Reiel & Helland, Leif & Morton, Rebecca, 2022. "Can paying politicians well reduce corruption? The effects of wages and uncertainty on electoral competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 60-73.
    20. Sarah Brierley, 2020. "Unprincipled Principals: Co‐opted Bureaucrats and Corruption in Ghana," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 64(2), pages 209-222, April.

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