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Competing for Transparency: Political Competition and Institutional Reform in Mexican States

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  • BERLINER, DANIEL
  • ERLICH, AARON

Abstract

Why do political actors undertake reforms that constrain their own discretion? We argue that uncertainty generated by political competition is a major driver of such reforms, and test this argument using subnational data on Mexican states’ adoption of state-level access to information (ATI) laws. Examining data from 31 Mexican states plus the Federal District, we find that more politically competitive states passed ATI laws more rapidly, even taking into account the party in power, levels of corruption, civil society, and other factors. The fine-grained nature of our data, reflecting the staggered timing of elections, inauguration dates, and dates of passage, allows us to distinguish between different theoretical mechanisms. We find the greatest evidence in favor of an insurance mechanism, by which incumbent parties who face uncertainty over future political control seek to ensure access to government information, and means of monitoring incumbents, in the future in case they lose power.

Suggested Citation

  • Berliner, Daniel & Erlich, Aaron, 2015. "Competing for Transparency: Political Competition and Institutional Reform in Mexican States," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 109(1), pages 110-128, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:109:y:2015:i:01:p:110-128_00
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Daniel Berliner, 2016. "Transnational advocacy and domestic law: International NGOs and the design of freedom of information laws," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 121-144, March.
    2. Berliner, Daniel & Bagozzi, Benjamin E. & Palmer-Rubin, Brian, 2018. "What information do citizens want? Evidence from one million information requests in Mexico," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 222-235.
    3. Jean Beuve & Marian W. Moszoro & Stéphane Saussier, 2019. "Political contestability and public contract rigidity: An analysis of procurement contracts," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(2), pages 316-335, April.
    4. Andrew Delios & Edmund J. Malesky & Shu Yu & Griffin Riddler, 2024. "Methodological errors in corruption research: Recommendations for future research," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 55(2), pages 235-251, March.
    5. Nicholas R. Jenkins & Michelangelo Landgrave & Gabriel E. Martinez, 2020. "Do political donors have greater access to government officials? Evidence from a FOIA field experiment with US municipalities," Journal of Behavioral Public Administration, Center for Experimental and Behavioral Public Administration, vol. 3(2).
    6. Seunghwan Myeong & Michael J. Ahn & Younhee Kim & Shengli Chu & Woojong Suh, 2021. "Government Data Performance: The Roles of Technology, Government Capacity, and Globalization through the Effects of National Innovativeness," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(22), pages 1-14, November.
    7. Žuffová, Mária, 2024. "Applying Text-as-data Methods to Information Requests: A Novel Approach to Study Different Political Phenomena," OSF Preprints 8p5e6, Center for Open Science.
    8. Relly, Jeannine E. & Rabbi, Md. Fazle & Sabharwal, Meghna & Pakanati, Rajdeep & Schwalbe, Ethan H., 2020. "More than a decade in the making: A study of the implementation of India's Right to Information Act," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 136(C).
    9. Krishna Chaitanya Vadlamannati & Arusha Cooray & Samuel Brazys, 2018. "Nothing to hide: Commitment to, compliance with, and impact of the special data dissemination standard," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(1), pages 55-77, March.
    10. Haizhen Mou & Maritza Lozano Man Hing, 2021. "Stringency of balanced budget laws and transparency of budgeting process," Public Budgeting & Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(2), pages 45-64, June.
    11. Changwony, Frederick Kibon & Paterson, Audrey S., 2019. "Accounting practice, fiscal decentralization and corruption," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(5).
    12. Jean Beuve & Marian W Moszoro & Pablo T Spiller, 2023. "Doing It by the Book: Political Contestability and Public Contract Renegotiations," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 39(1), pages 281-308.
    13. Krishna Chaitanya Vadlamannati & Arusha Cooray, 2015. "Do transparency initiatives work? Assessing the impact of the Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS) on data transparency," CAMA Working Papers 2015-24, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
    14. Eliška Drápalová & Fabrizio Di Mascio, 2020. "Islands of Good Government: Explaining Successful Corruption Control in Two Spanish Cities," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 8(2), pages 128-139.
    15. Branko Stanic, 2018. "Determinants of subnational budget/fiscal transparency: a review of empirical evidence," Public Sector Economics, Institute of Public Finance, vol. 42(4), pages 449-486.

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