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Elite Parties and Poor Voters: Theory and Evidence from India

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  • THACHIL, TARIQ

Abstract

Why do poor people often vote against their material interests? This article extends the study of this global paradox to the non-Western world by considering how it manifests within India, the world's biggest democracy. Arguments derived from studies of advanced democracies (such as values voting) or of poor polities (such as patronage and ethnic appeals) fail to explain this important phenomenon. Instead, I outline a novel strategy predicated on an electoral division of labor enabling elite parties to recruit the poor while retaining the rich. Recruitment is outsourced to nonparty affiliates that provide basic services to appeal to poor communities. Such outsourcing permits the party to maintain programmatic linkages to its elite core. Empirically, I test this argument with qualitative and quantitative evidence, including a survey of more than 9,000 voters. Theoretically, I argue that this approach is best suited to elite parties with thick organizations, typically those linked to religious social movements.

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  • Thachil, Tariq, 2014. "Elite Parties and Poor Voters: Theory and Evidence from India," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 108(2), pages 454-477, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:108:y:2014:i:02:p:454-477_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Johannes Meya & Panu Poutvaara & Robert Schwager, 2015. "Pocketbook Voting and Social Preferences in Referenda," CESifo Working Paper Series 5267, CESifo.
    2. Hyunwoo Kim, 2023. "Monetary technocracy and democratic accountability: how central bank independence conditions economic voting," Review of International Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 30(3), pages 939-964, May.
    3. Chau, Nancy H. & Liu, Yanyan & Soundararajan, Vidhya, 2021. "Political activism as a determinant of strategic transfers: Evidence from an indian public works program," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 132(C).
    4. Amal Ahmad, 2024. "Transfers and the rise of Hindu nationalism in India," Discussion Papers 2024-08, Nottingham Interdisciplinary Centre for Economic and Political Research (NICEP).
    5. Diego Maiorano, 2019. "The 2019 Indian Elections and the Ruralization of the BJP," Studies in Indian Politics, , vol. 7(2), pages 176-190, December.
    6. Jeremy Bowles & Horacio Larreguy & Shelley Liu, 2020. "How Weakly Institutionalized Parties Monitor Brokers in Developing Democracies: Evidence from Postconflict Liberia," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 64(4), pages 952-967, October.
    7. Anderson, Siwan & Francois, Patrick, 2023. "Reservations and the politics of fear," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 225(C).
    8. Pavithra Suryanarayan, 2017. "When do the poor vote for the right-wing and why: Status inequality and vote choice in the Indian states," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2017-20, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    9. Rajkamal Singh & Garima Goel, 2019. "Organizing a Victory: A Review Essay on the BJP’s 2014 Electoral Success," Studies in Indian Politics, , vol. 7(2), pages 274-280, December.
    10. Margherita Bove & Eva-Maria Egger & Sam Jones & Patricia Justino & Ricardo Santos, 2024. "Inequality and voting in fragile countries: Evidence from Mozambique," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2024-9, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).

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