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Why Small, Centrist Third Parties Motivate Policy Divergence by Major Parties

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  • ADAMS, JAMES
  • MERRILL, SAMUEL

Abstract

Plurality-based elections between two major parties or candidates sometimes feature small, centrist, third parties. We modify the standard two-party spatial model of policy-seeking parties to incorporate a centrist third party, and we show that the presence of such a party—even if it has no chance of winning—motivates the major parties to propose policies that are much more divergent than without the third party. We derive explicit formulas for party locations at a three-party equilibrium and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of that equilibrium. We show that, over time, the major parties can be expected to shift their policies in the same direction relative to each other but in the opposite direction relative to the minor party. The predictions of this model are compared with estimates of party policy locations during appropriate periods in postwar Britain.

Suggested Citation

  • Adams, James & Merrill, Samuel, 2006. "Why Small, Centrist Third Parties Motivate Policy Divergence by Major Parties," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 100(3), pages 403-417, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:100:y:2006:i:03:p:403-417_06
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    Cited by:

    1. Samuel Merrill & Bernard Grofman, 2019. "What are the effects of entry of new extremist parties on the policy platforms of mainstream parties?," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 31(3), pages 453-473, July.
    2. Mihir Bhattacharya, 2018. "A model of electoral competition between national and regional parties," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 30(3), pages 335-357, July.
    3. Roland Füss & Michael Bechtel, 2008. "Partisan politics and stock market performance: The effect of expected government partisanship on stock returns in the 2002 German federal election," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 135(3), pages 131-150, June.
    4. James F. Adams, 2015. "Competing for votes," Chapters, in: Jac C. Heckelman & Nicholas R. Miller (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Voting, chapter 12, pages 201-217, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    5. James Adams & Samuel Merrill, 2013. "Policy-seeking candidates who value the valence attributes of the winner," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 155(1), pages 139-161, April.
    6. Madiha Afzal, 2014. "Do barriers to candidacy reduce political competition? Evidence from a bachelor’s degree requirement for legislators in Pakistan," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 161(1), pages 51-72, October.
    7. Eiselt, H.A. & Marianov, Vladimir, 2020. "Maximizing political vote in multiple districts," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    8. Drometer, Marcus & Rincke, Johannes, 2014. "Electoral competition and endogenous barriers to entry," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 253-262.

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