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How Institutions Affect Outcomes in Laboratory Tradable Fishing Allowance Systems

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  • Anderson, Christopher M.

Abstract

The objective of this paper is to illustrate that economic institutions matter, i.e., that different rules of trade present different incentives for bidding, asking, and trading in new markets, and that these different incentives lead to different price discovery patterns, which yield materially different outcomes. In a laboratory tradable fishing allowance system, when trade takes place through a double auction, which parallels an institution common in extant tradable allowance systems, markets are characterized by high volatility, and equilibrium does not obtain. However, when only leases, and not permanent trades, are permitted in the early periods, volatility is significantly reduced and equilibrium obtains. This dependence of equilibration and outcomes on institutions implies policy-oriented economists must consider institutions in designing new market-based management systems.

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  • Anderson, Christopher M., 2004. "How Institutions Affect Outcomes in Laboratory Tradable Fishing Allowance Systems," Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 33(2), pages 193-208, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:agrerw:v:33:y:2004:i:02:p:193-208_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Murphy, James J. & Stevens, Thomas H., 2004. "Contingent Valuation, Hypothetical Bias, and Experimental Economics," Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 33(2), pages 182-192, October.
    2. Anderson, Christopher M. & Sutinen, Jon G., 2006. "The effect of initial lease periods on price discovery in laboratory tradable fishing allowance markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 164-180, October.
    3. Keisaku Higashida & Kenta Tanaka & Shunsuke Managi, 2011. "Is the behavior of fishers rational under Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) regimes? An Experimental Approach," Discussion Paper Series 73, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, revised Aug 2011.

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