IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cuf/journl/y2015v16i1shenzou.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Fiscal Decentralization and Public Services Provision in China

Author

Listed:
  • Chunli Shen

    (University of Maryland)

  • Xiaojun Zhao

    (School of Economics, Peking University)

  • Heng-fu Zou

    (Central University of Finance and Economics CEMA
    Wuhan University IAS
    Peking University
    China Development Bank)

Abstract

The last decade has witnessed a world trend of fiscal decentralization in the developing countries as an escape from inadequate growth and inefficient governance. With respect to China, fiscal decentralization has been a fundamental aspect of its transition to a market economy; and the country has made substantial efforts to break down its highly centralized fiscal management system. China's fiscal system currently has five levels - central, provincial, prefecture, county, and township. Sub-national governments have been assigned primary responsibility for public services provision and ï¬ nancing. China's highly decentralized system could be a boon to managing service delivery, but the country's crave for rapid economic growth in the last two decades has kept the reform of the public services on the fringes of political agenda. Under the current arrangements, public services are extensively decentralized with sub-national governments taking a much larger portion of expenditure responsibilities that are out of line with international practice. The over-devolution of spending responsibilities has resulted in insufficient ï¬ nancing and provision for core public services, and particularly a default in the delivery of vital services in many rural and poor localities. Further, in the absence of mechanisms to ensure national minimum service standards, the decentralized public services delivery system is faced with growing inequality across the country due to the widening regional disparity in economic development over the past decade. This paper reviews fiscal decentralization policies in China, identifies prominent issues in the current pubic service delivery system, and examines the deficiencies in the existing intergovernmental fiscal system that have contributed to insufficiency and inequality in public services provision. It advises plausible reform options to further national objectives.

Suggested Citation

  • Chunli Shen & Xiaojun Zhao & Heng-fu Zou, 2014. "Fiscal Decentralization and Public Services Provision in China," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 15(1), pages 521-547, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:cuf:journl:y:2015:v:16:i:1:shen:zou
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://down.aefweb.net/AefArticles/aef150104ShenZhaoZou.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Junaid Ahmad & Shantayanan Devarajan & Stuti Khemani & Shekhar Shah, 2006. "Decentralization and Service Delivery," Chapters, in: Ehtisham Ahmad & Giorgio Brosio (ed.), Handbook of Fiscal Federalism, chapter 10, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Chunli Shen & Jing Jin & Heng-fu Zou, 2012. "Fiscal Decentralization in China: History, Impact, Challenges and Next Steps," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 13(1), pages 1-51, May.
    2. Anping Chen & Nicolaas Groenewold, 2017. "An increase in the retirement age in China: the regional economic effects," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 49(7), pages 702-721, February.
    3. Peter J. Stauvermann & Ronald R. Kumar, 2015. "The Dilemma of International Capital Tax Competition in the Presence of Public Capital and Endogenous Growth," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 16(2), pages 255-272, November.
    4. Bao, Helen X.H. & Wang, Ziyou & Wu, Robert Liangqi, 2024. "Understanding local government debt financing of infrastructure projects in China: Evidence based on accounting data from local government financing vehicles," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 136(C).
    5. Dang Hai-Anh H. & Huang Yang & Selod Harris, 2020. "Children Left Behind in China: The Role of School Fees," IZA Journal of Development and Migration, Sciendo & Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH (IZA), vol. 11(1), pages 1-29, January.
    6. Siham MATALLAH & Lahouari BENLAHCENE, 2021. "Public service delivery dilemma and economic growth challenges in the MENA Region," Theoretical and Applied Economics, Asociatia Generala a Economistilor din Romania / Editura Economica, vol. 0(4(629), W), pages 31-50, Winter.
    7. Man Xu & Qing Shi, 2018. "A Theoretic Approach to China's Housing Market Boom and Down Payment Loans," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 19(1), pages 265-278, May.
    8. Qichun He & Meng Sun, 2018. "Does Fiscal Decentralization Increase the Investment Rate? Evidence from Chinese Panel Data," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 19(1), pages 75-101, May.
    9. Zhiguo Wang & Liang Ma, 2014. "Fiscal Decentralization in China: A Literature Review," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 15(1), pages 51-65, May.
    10. Yu Wang & Jingqian Li, 2024. "How Public Service Investment Affects Public Incomes: Evidence from Shanghai, China," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 16(13), pages 1-20, June.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Skoufias, Emmanuel & Narayan, Ambar & Dasgupta, Basab & Kaiser, Kai, 2011. "Electoral accountability, fiscal decentralization and service delivery in Indonesia," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5614, The World Bank.
    2. Fabio Sánchez, 2006. "Descentralización Y Progreso En El Acceso A Los Servicios Sociales De Educación, Salud Y Agua Y Alcantarillado," Documentos CEDE 2287, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
    3. World Bank, 2007. "Local Government Discretion and Accountability : A Local Governance Framework," World Bank Publications - Reports 7859, The World Bank Group.
    4. Jeremy Bowles & Benjamin Marx, 2022. "Turnover and Accountability in Africa's Parliaments," Working Papers hal-03873800, HAL.
    5. Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, 2024. "Organizational dynamics: culture, design, and performance," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 40(2), pages 394-415.
    6. Makokha, Racheal Omukhulu, 2017. "Does Decentralization Improve Provision of Health Services? Evidence from Kisumu and Makueni Counties in Kenya," Thesis Commons xef7a, Center for Open Science.
    7. Ahmad Zafarullah Abdul Jalil & Mukaramah Harun & Siti Hadijah Che Mat, 2012. "Macroeconomic Instability and Fiscal Decentralization: An Empirical Analysis," Prague Economic Papers, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2012(2), pages 150-165.
    8. Elizabeth M. King & Peter F. Orazem & Elizabeth M. Paterno, 2016. "Promotion with and without Learning: Effects on Student Enrollment and Dropout Behavior," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 30(3), pages 580-602.
    9. Benitez, Daniel & Estache, Antonio & Soreide, Tina, 2010. "Dealing with politics for money and power in infrastructure," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5455, The World Bank.
    10. Diether W. Beuermann & Maria Amelina, 2018. "Does participatory budgeting improve decentralized public service delivery? Experimental evidence from rural Russia," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 19(4), pages 339-379, November.
    11. Dasgupta, Basab & Narayan, Ambar & Skoufias, Emmanuel, 2009. "Measuring the quality of education and health services : the use of perception data from Indonesia," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5033, The World Bank.
    12. Gonçalves, Sónia, 2014. "The Effects of Participatory Budgeting on Municipal Expenditures and Infant Mortality in Brazil," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 94-110.
    13. World Bank, 2008. "Guinea - Decentralization in Guinea : Strengthening Accountability for Better Service Delivery," World Bank Publications - Reports 7891, The World Bank Group.
    14. Independent Evaluation Group, 2010. "Water and Development : An Evaluation of World Bank Support, 1997-2007, Volume 1," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 2485.
    15. Mr. Giorgio Brosio & Mr. Ehtisham Ahmad & Ms. Maria Gonzalez, 2006. "Uganda: Managing More Effective Decentralization," IMF Working Papers 2006/279, International Monetary Fund.
    16. Cheng, Yuk-Shing & Chung, Kim-Sau, 2013. "Too many mothers-in-law?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 69-76.
    17. Jesse Ribot, 2018. "Choice, Recognition and the Democracy Effects of Decentralization," Working Papers id:12487, eSocialSciences.
    18. Abdul Jalil, Ahmad Zafarullah, 2009. "Decentralization, Subnational Governments' Behaviour and Macroeconomic Instability: The Case of Malaysia," MPRA Paper 19071, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    19. repec:idb:brikps:70098 is not listed on IDEAS
    20. Roy Bahl & Musharraf Cyan & Sally Wallace, 2011. "Challenge to Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in Pakistan: The Revenue Assignment Dimension," Chapters, in: Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & François Vaillancourt (ed.), Decentralization in Developing Countries, chapter 4, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    21. Fossati, Diego, 2016. "Beyond “Good Governance”: The Multi-level Politics of Health Insurance for the Poor in Indonesia," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 291-306.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cuf:journl:y:2015:v:16:i:1:shen:zou. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Qiang Gao (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/emcufcn.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.