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Contingent Liability, Capital Requirements, and Financial Reform

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  • Joshua R. Hendrickson

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  • Joshua R. Hendrickson, 2014. "Contingent Liability, Capital Requirements, and Financial Reform," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 34(1), pages 129-144, Winter.
    • Handle: RePEc:cto:journl:v:34:y:2014:i:1:p:129-144
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Grossman, Richard S, 2001. "Double Liability and Bank Risk Taking," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 33(2), pages 143-159, May.
    2. Hickson, Charles R. & Turner, John D. & McCann, Claire, 2005. "Much ado about nothing: the limitation of liability and the market for 19th century Irish bank stock," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 459-476, July.
    3. Yue Cheng & Christopher J. Green, 2008. "Taxes And Capital Structure: A Study Of European Companies," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 76(s1), pages 85-115, September.
    4. Hickson, Charles R. & Turner, John D., 2003. "The Trading of Unlimited Liability Bank Shares in Nineteenth-Century Ireland: The Bagehot Hypothesis," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 63(4), pages 931-958, December.
    5. Susan E. Woodward, 1985. "On the Economics of Limited Liability," UCLA Economics Working Papers 371, UCLA Department of Economics.
    6. Mitchener, Kris James & Richardson, Gary, 2013. "Does “skin in the game” reduce risk taking? Leverage, liability and the long-run consequences of new deal banking reforms," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 508-525.
    7. Alfons J. Weichenrieder & Tina Klautke & Alfons Weichenrieder, 2008. "Taxes and the Efficiency Costs of Capital Distortions," CESifo Working Paper Series 2431, CESifo.
    8. Grossman, Peter Z, 1995. "The Market for Shares of Companies with Unlimited Liability: The Case of American Express," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(1), pages 63-85, January.
    9. Evans, Lewis T & Quigley, Neil C, 1995. "Shareholder Liability Regimes, Principal-Agent Relationships, and Banking Industry Performance," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 38(2), pages 497-520, October.
    10. John R. Graham, 2003. "Taxes and Corporate Finance: A Review," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 16(4), pages 1075-1129.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hendrickson, Joshua R. & Salter, Alexander W., 2018. "Going beyond monetary constitutions: The congruence of money and finance," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 22-28.
    2. Bogle, David A. & Campbell, Gareth & Coyle, Christopher & Turner, John D., 2024. "Why did shareholder liability disappear?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 152(C).
    3. Grodecka, Anna & Kotidis, Antonis, 2016. "Double Liability in a Branch Banking System: Historical Evidence from Canada," Working Paper Series 316, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden).
    4. Salter, Alexander W. & Veetil, Vipin & White, Lawrence H., 2017. "Extended shareholder liability as a means to constrain moral hazard in insured banks," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 153-160.
    5. Haelim Anderson & Daniel Barth & Dong Beom Choi, 2018. "Reducing moral hazard at the expense of market discipline: the effectiveness of double liability before and during the Great Depression," Staff Reports 869, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    6. Miller, Stephen Matteo, 2024. "Synthetic unlimited liability," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 241(C).

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    • R00 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General - - - General
    • Z0 - Other Special Topics - - General

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