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Will Federal Centralization Help the Poor? Comment [How Should the Redistributive Power of the State be Divided between Federal and Provincial Governments?]

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  • Edwin G. West

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  • Edwin G. West, 1980. "Will Federal Centralization Help the Poor? Comment [How Should the Redistributive Power of the State be Divided between Federal and Provincial Governments?]," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 6(4), pages 662-667, Autumn.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpp:issued:v:6:y:1980:i:4:p:662-667
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. T. K. Rymes, 1979. "Money, Efficiency, and Knowledge," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 12(4), pages 575-589, November.
    2. Usher, Dan, 1977. "The welfare economics of the socialization of commodities," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 151-168, October.
    3. Stigler, George J, 1970. "Director's Law of Public Income Redistribution," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(1), pages 1-10, April.
    4. Edwin G. West & Stanley L. Winer, 1980. "The Individual, Political Tension, and Canada's Quest for a New Constitution," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 6(1), pages 3-15, Winter.
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