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Is it Better to Live in a Basement, an Attic or to Get your own Place? Analyzing the Costs and Benefits of Institutional Change for Northwestern Ontario

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  • Livio Di Matteo
  • J.C. Herbert Emery
  • Ryan English

Abstract

We analyze the prospects for institutional change in the alienated hinterland region of northwestern Ontario. Among the scenarios we examine are union with Manitoba, provincial status, and regional government. We find that there would be political benefits for the residents of the Thunder Bay, Rainy River, and Kenora Census Districts from a union with Manitoba as they would have a larger voice in the Manitoba legislature than they have at Queen's Park in Toronto. As for the economic benefits, voters in northwestern Ontario would have to trade off having higher spending and taxes as part of Manitoba, against Ontario's lower spending levels that come with lower personal tax burdens. As for other options, the economic evidence supporting provincial status is for the most part ambiguous with no overwhelming case either for or against. Regional government is the easiest option to implement, but will do the least to end regional alienation. In the end, any changes from the status quo will require the mobilization of the political will of northwestern Ontarians and will have substantial political transactions costs.

Suggested Citation

  • Livio Di Matteo & J.C. Herbert Emery & Ryan English, 2006. "Is it Better to Live in a Basement, an Attic or to Get your own Place? Analyzing the Costs and Benefits of Institutional Change for Northwestern Ontario," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 32(2), pages 173-196, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpp:issued:v:32:y:2006:i:2:p:173-196
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    1. J.C. Herbert Emery & Ronald D. Kneebone, 2008. "Socialists, Populists, Resources, and the Divergent Development of Alberta and Saskatchewan," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 34(4), pages 419-440, December.

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