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Separation of the telecommunications operator as a tool for market regulation. The case of the telecommunications sector in Poland

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  • Renata Sliwa

    (Malopolska School of Economics)

Abstract

The paper is an attempt to present the nature of functional separation as a regulation means in the conditions of the Polish telecommunications market. First, the theoretical foundations will be laid, then the arguments for and against the functional separation, and finally, the possible picture of functional separation in the Polish conditions of the telecommunications market.

Suggested Citation

  • Renata Sliwa, 2012. "Separation of the telecommunications operator as a tool for market regulation. The case of the telecommunications sector in Poland," Ekonomia i Prawo, Uniwersytet Mikolaja Kopernika, vol. 8(1), pages 211-225, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpn:umkeip:v:8:y:2012:i:1:p:211-225
    DOI: 10.12775/EiP.2012.013
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Dieter Helm, 2001. "Making Britain More Competitive: A Critique of Regulation and Competition policy," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 48(5), pages 471-487, November.
    2. Martin Ricketts, . "The Economics of Business Enterprise," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 3121.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    telecommunications operator; market regulation;

    JEL classification:

    • A - General Economics and Teaching

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