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Theory Of The Firm, Management And Stakeholders: An Islamic Perspective

Author

Listed:
  • AZID, TOSEEF

    (Bahauddin Zakariya University)

  • ASUTAY, MEHMET

    (Durham University)

  • BURKI, UMAR

    (Molde University)

Abstract

This paper explores the impact of the behaviour of a firm and its management on its stakeholders operating within the framework of Islamic law and morality and draws a sketch of a socially responsible enterprise which Islam idealizes in the domain of business and trade. The study suggests that endogenoising the ethical cum economic dimensions will enhance the efficiency level of the economy, and will also increase social welfare level.

Suggested Citation

  • Azid, Toseef & Asutay, Mehmet & Burki, Umar, 2007. "Theory Of The Firm, Management And Stakeholders: An Islamic Perspective," Islamic Economic Studies, The Islamic Research and Training Institute (IRTI), vol. 15, pages 1-30.
    • Handle: RePEc:ris:isecst:0034
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Joel Isabirye, 2021. "The Behavioral Theory of the Firm: Foundations, Tenets and Relevance," Technium Social Sciences Journal, Technium Science, vol. 19(1), pages 324-335, May.
    2. Shahriar, Shawon Muhammad & Alam, Md. Mahmudul & Said, Jamaliah & Monzur-E-Elahi, Mohammad, 2019. "Waqf as a Tool for Rendering Social Welfare Services in the Social Entrepreneurship Context," SocArXiv 8bfjy, Center for Open Science.

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